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TORT, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND NO-FAULT
SCHEMES: LESSONS FROM REAL-WORLD
EXPERIMENTS
GERHARD WAGNER*
In dealing with the problem of personal injury, societies have to make a
choice between regimes of tort liability, the general social security system,
and tailor-made no-fault compensation schemes. The arguments bearing on
this choice are complex and difficult to justify. However, in one important
area most industrialized countries operate a no-fault scheme already, and
have done so for almost a century, namely workplace accidents and
occupational diseases. In spite of the long tradition of workers’
compensation systems, it is unclear whether they are a good or a bad thing.
A few decades ago and thus relatively recently, two jurisdictions—the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands—have abandoned workers’
compensation for a combination of employers’ liability with rather
generous protection under the general system of social security. Now the
time has come to review the experience of these jurisdictions and compare
it to the performance of workers’ compensation systems that continue to
operate in much of the rest of the industrialized world. One recent and
important example that highlights the differences between the two
approaches involves the way each deals with claims for compensation of
diseases caused by asbestos. The asbestos cases also illustrate the current
challenges faced by workers’ compensation systems: tort suits brought
against employers alleging intention or other forms of aggravated fault and
launched against third parties under theories of products liability. In the
United States, workers’ compensation systems have been pushed aside by
mass litigation, where manufacturers of equipment and raw materials are
named as defendants. This development has no parallel in other
jurisdictions and raises important policy issues that are ripe for a fresh
discussion.
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INTRODUCTION
The choice between tort law and other compensation systems such as
social insurance and no-fault compensation schemes has been the subject of
academic discussion for decades. While proposals for no-fault
compensation schemes, particularly in the area of traffic accidents, were
implemented in some jurisdictions, the thrust of this movement has faded
away.1 Currently, there is some discussion on shifting medical malpractice
into no-fault compensation schemes. In Scandinavian countries, first-party
patient insurance has more-or-less replaced tort, and scholars have advised
both European jurisdictions2 and the United States3 to follow this model.
The discussions of no-fault compensation or insurance schemes as a
replacement or a supplement to tort seem to circle around the same issues,

1. The seminal publication is ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION
ACCIDENT VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965); see also
DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW:
TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 22–26 (1996) (providing an overview of the spread of no-fault motor
accident schemes and their performance).
2. See generally JOS DUTE, MICHAEL G. FAURE & HELMUT KOZIOL, NO-FAULT COMPENSATION
IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR (2004).
3. See Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: How No-Fault
and Tort Differ, 60 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 36 (1997).
FOR THE
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regardless of the subject matter involved. Invariably, the driving force
behind no-fault plans is to economize administrative costs.4 The tort system
consumes a large fraction of the money that goes around for itself—in the
form of court and lawyers’ fees instead of allocating the funds to victims
for the purpose of compensation. No-fault schemes seek to award the
victims a larger share of the overall costs of the system. The main concern
advanced against the move away from a tort system is deterrence; the
incentives to take care and to adjust activity levels are weakened if the
threat of liability is removed.5 Empirical studies are somewhat diverse but
seem to confirm the prediction that incentives to take care suffer with the
introduction of no-fault plans. However, where injuries to the victim’s
health and body are at stake, i.e., damage that is impossible to replace and
difficult to “repair,” the effect is smaller than anticipated.6
This Article does not focus on how exactly the trade-off between
efficient administration and efficient deterrence should be made in regard
to specific subject-matter areas such as traffic accidents or medical
malpractice. Rather, it focuses on the single area where no-fault has in fact
been operating for decades in most jurisdictions: workplace accidents and
occupational diseases. The no-fault plan that governs in this area is called
workers’ compensation, which has replaced the liability of the employer
that previously existed. The evaluation of these institutions in light of the
compensation and deterrence goals raises complex issues about the
performance of workers’ compensation systems that are already in place,
but also about the performance of hypothetical systems of employers’
liability that would exist, if it weren’t for workers’ compensation schemes.
While this Article cannot provide a definite answer to this empirical
question, it highlights the experience of two European countries, the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, which decades ago abandoned their systems
of workers’ compensation in favor of reviving the private cause of action
against the employer. Now the time has come to ask how this choice has
fared in practice (Part V). In addition, the article confronts challenges to
workers’ compensation systems that have arisen in the U.S. particularly,
namely movements around the immunity rule of workers’ compensation,
which rely on suits against employers, alleging aggravated fault, and,
4. KEETON & O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that the “operation of the present system
[of liability in tort] is excessively expensive”).
5. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093
(1993).
6. For a recent empirical study see J. David Cummins, Mary A. Weiss & Richard D. Phillips,
The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 44 J. L. & ECON. 427 (2001); for an overview
of past empirical studies and results, see Yu-Ping Liao & Michelle J. White, No-Fault for Motor
Vehicles: An Economic Analysis, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 258, 262–64 (2002).

WAGNER_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

1/9/2013 11:58 AM

TORT, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND NO-FAULT SCHEMES

5

secondly, damages claims brought against third parties (Part VI). Before
confronting these real-world examples it is important to understand the
central features of the competing regimes as well as the policy issues
underlying the choice between workers’ compensation and employers’
liability. In order to set the stage, Parts I and II begin with a brief
recollection of the basic principles of workers’ compensation systems and
of employers’ liability. Part IV then offers an economic analysis of the
relevant policy issues along the three familiar dimensions of efficient
deterrence, efficient risk-bearing, and efficient administration of claims.
The topics discussed include the choice between liability rules, the
existence and scope of the contributory negligence defense, the option of
entrusting the administration claims to public or private insurance agencies,
and the choice between a judicial or amicable mechanism of dispute of
resolution.
I. SYSTEMS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: BASIC FEATURES
There is no single workers’ compensation system. Instead, there are as
many systems as there are jurisdictions running such programs. This is
most pronounced in the United States where each state operates its own
workers’ compensation system.7 In spite of all the resulting variation, the
central features of workers’ compensation systems are surprisingly stable
across jurisdictions. These features are outlined below.
A. Compensation Regardless of Fault of Employer and Contributory Fault
of Employee
The primary goal of a workers’ compensation system is to compensate
workers who have suffered job-related accidents or diseases. Thus,
workers’ compensation systems are based on the principle of strict
liability,where workers are entitled to compensation regardless of fault on
the part of the employer.8 Even where due care had been taken, so that the
injury or disease is the consequence of a contingency that could not have
been avoided at reasonable cost, the employee-victim still recovers. The
employer or the workers’ compensation organization against which claims
are to be directed cannot defend itself by establishing that a fellow
employee caused the harm. Finally, the claim even survives in cases where
the worker inflicted the injury upon himself through behavior that would be
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.
8. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW, Vol. 2, § 6.3, at 5–8 (1999) (regarding
United States Law); YVONNE LAMBERT-FAIVRE & STÉPHANIE PORCHY-SIMON, DROIT DU DOMMAGE
CORPOREL, SYSTÈMES D’INDEMNISATION, ¶355 (7th ed. 2011) (Fr.) (regarding French law); HEIN KÖTZ
& GERHARD WAGNER, DELIKTSRECHT 229–31 (10th ed. 2010) (Ger.).
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classified as contributory negligence in tort.9
B. Insurance and Collectivization of Claims
The original German model of workers’ compensation deliberately
avoided the private insurance market and thus eschewed the option of a
combination of strict employers’ liability and mandatory insurance.10
Instead, new administrative institutions were created by combining features
of a public insurance company with those of a regulatory agency charged
with overseeing firms and ensuring workplace safety.11 Within this
framework, the party who is strictly liable is not the employer himself but
the newly created public insurance carrier. However, employers bear the
full financial burden of the system and thus remain “strictly liable” for the
costs of defending, processing, and satisfying claims for compensation of
work-related accidents and diseases.
While most countries in Europe and elsewhere have followed the
German model, the United States has taken a different course that relies on
the private insurance industry instead of public quasi-insurers.12 Only six
states require the employer to participate in a state-run workers’
compensation scheme;13 the majority merely impose an obligation to insure
against the liabilities generated by workers’ compensation.14 What the
European systems achieve by transferring liability to public entities, these
jurisdictions achieve through a combination of private liability insurance
and the involvement of an administrative institution overseeing the
program.15 The personal liability of the employer is not the original one
that existed under the common law of torts, but a liability regime created
by the workers’ compensation statutes themselves and reflecting the
9. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.11, at 48; see also PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION – A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 40 (1998); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 229, 231.
10. See generally John M. Kleeberg, From Strict Liability to Workers’ Compensation: The
Prussian Railroad Law, The German Liability Act, and the Introduction of Bismarck’s Accident
Insurance in Germany, 1838-1884, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 53 (2003) (describing the origins and
historical background of workers’ compensation schemes in the German Accident Insurance Act of
1884, inspired by then-chancellor Bismarck); see also KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 225–27.
11. Compare FRANÇOIS EWALD, L’ÉTAT PROVIDENCE [THE WELFARE STATE] 229 (1986) (Fr.)
(describing French institutions), with KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 233–34 (describing German
institutions): see cmt. to fn. 8.
12. See generally Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’
Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J. L. & ECON. 305 (1998) (providing a brief and
informative overview of the development of workers’ compensation in the United States).
13. The states requiring employers to participate in state-run workers’ compensation schemes are
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming; LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 78.
14. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, PRACTITIONER’S TREATISE, Vol. 2, 1098–99 (2001).
15. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.34, at 159; LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 75–82; DAN D.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1098 (2000).
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general features of such systems.
Regardless of these differences, the central feature of workers’
compensation remains that the claim of the worker is independent of the
solvency or even the continuing existence of the former employer.16 In this
sense, workers’ compensation systems imply a collectivization of claims.
C. Scope of Protection
Workers’ compensation systems do not compensate just any harm
suffered by employees in the course of work. Their scope of protection
remains limited to particular categories of harm, namely personal injury,
disease, and death.17 Damage to property as well as pure financial losses
continue to remain outside of the scope of protection. In principle, the same
is true for dignitary injuries and other types of harm to nonphysical
interests of the person. However, it has become increasingly difficult to
draw the line between physical and nonphysical personal rights.
D. Limited Compensation
Tort law generally provides for full compensation. While it may be
difficult to establish the elements of a private cause of action in tort, the
successful claimant is entitled to comprehensive relief. The party held
liable must “make the victim whole again,” i.e., restore the victim to the
situation she would have been in but for the wrongful behavior. In cases of
personal injury, the tortfeasor is liable for the costs of medical care, full
replacement of lost wages, and any other pecuniary loss suffered as a result
of the injury, such as the costs of devices and appliances that assist disabled
persons in their daily lives. On top of that come damages for nonpecuniary
loss, i.e., for the pain and suffering sustained due to the injury and the
disabilities or disfigurements that remain after the resources of medical
treatment have been exhausted. While it may not be possible to render the
victim fully neutral between the hypothetical state of the world without the
harm and the actual state of the world that includes a money payment, full
compensation aims to get as close to this state as possible.
Workers’ compensation systems function very differently from the

16. LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 9 (“What is given includes something very valuable: the certainty
that funds will be available to pay the benefits by virtue of compulsory insurance coverage (or approved
self-insured status) for all employers.”).
17. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 6.24, at 99–100 (describing workers’
compensation coverage in the United States); DOBBS, supra note 14, at 1098 (describing workers’
compensation coverage in the United States); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶
372–79 (describing workers’ compensation coverage in France); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at
228 (describing workers’ compensation coverage in Germany).
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private law of torts and damages. As far as medical care is concerned,
workers’ compensation carriers normally provide it “in kind,” by referring
patients to medical service providers operating on their behalf and under
their control, or by at least requiring the patient to obtain authorization
from the carrier before turning to other physicians and hospitals.18
Damages for lost earnings are not calculated in each individual case with
the aim of making the victim whole, but are based on schedules or grids.19
To the extent that benefits are not scheduled, they are calculated on the
basis of reduced earning capacity or, depending on the jurisdiction, reduced
physical capacity, which are both independent of the amount of income
actually lost by the victim-applicant.20
In many jurisdictions, the common method of benefit-assessment in
cases of partial or full, temporary or permanent disablement is to have the
handicap resulting from the injury or disease assessed by a medical expert
who establishes the percentage-degree of disablement, and then to award a
pension which reflects the degree of disablement and the level of wages
earned before the harm.21 Depending on how the system is calibrated,
where the degree of disablement is 100% the employee may be entitled to
full income substitution, while in cases of partial disability the level of
compensation will be set correspondingly, as a fraction of the income
earned at the time of injury.22 Income benefits are commonly subject to an
absolute cap, as well as to a relative one expressed in terms of a maximum
18. LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 373 (describing medical care provided
under workers’ compensation schemes in France); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–86, §
6.27, at 120–21 (describing medical care provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United
States); LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 50–51 (describing medical care provided under workers’
compensation schemes in the United States); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 231–32 (describing
medical care provided under workers’ compensation schemes in Germany).
19. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, 1999, § 6.23, at 85-86, § 6.29, at 133–38 (describing
calculations for damages for lost earnings provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United
States); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 378. (describing calculations for damages
for lost earnings provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the France).
20. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 6.28, at 124–33 (describing calculations
of benefits provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United States); LAMBERT-FAIVRE &
PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 370, 378 (describing calculations of benefits provided under workers’
compensation schemes in France); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 232–33 (describing calculations
of benefits provided under workers’ compensation schemes in Germany).
21. KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 232–33 (describing benefit assessments provided under
workers’ compensation schemes in Germany; LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶370,
378 (describing calculations for damages for lost earnings provided under workers’ compensation
schemes in France).
22. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, 1999, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 6.31, at 143–46 (describing the
calculation of income substitution provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United
States); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶378–79 (describing the calculation of
income substitution provided under workers’ compensation schemes in France).
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fraction of pre-injury earnings. In jurisdictions where benefits are not
subject to income tax, the typical measure of income replacement for fully
disabled workers is two thirds of the pre-injury wages.23 Typically,
compensation is not awarded as a lump sum but in the form of a pension
that is paid in addition to wages still being earned. From time to time, the
level of the pension will be adjusted to account for inflation and possible
increases in the overall level of wages. In this sense, workers’
compensation systems grant damages in the abstract, independent of the
facts of the case. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has famously held
that a worker who, subsequent to the injury, underwent re-training and
managed to earn three times his pre-injury salary was nonetheless entitled
to partial disability benefits.24
A striking difference between the damages available under tort and the
benefits due under workers’ compensation is that the latter excludes
compensation for nonpecuniary harm, in particular, damages for pain and
suffering. Likewise, while some jurisdictions entertain regimes of punitive
damages in tort claims, this remedy is not available in workers’
compensation, so injured workers never receive monetary benefits beyond
those in the form of pensions.
E. Resolution of Disputes Out of Court
The concentration of liability in a single entity, be it a public workers’
compensation carrier or a private insurance company that is overseen by an
administrative agency, makes it easier to implement special procedures for
the purpose of resolving disputes. While institutions and procedures vary
across jurisdictions, they all share central features of alternative dispute
resolution.25 Typically, the aggrieved worker files her claim with the
competent workers’ compensation carrier who, in case of approval, will
provide immediate relief in the form of medical care and income
replacement. If the claim is rejected and a dispute arises, special dispute
resolution boards will investigate the case and, depending on the

23. LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 52–58 (describing the calculation of income substitution for fully
disabled workers provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United States); LAMBERTFAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶378 (describing the calculation of income substitution for
fully disabled workers provided under workers’ compensation schemes in France).
24. See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 138–39 (1997) (holding that “a worker is
entitled to nominal compensation when his work-related injury has not diminished his present wageearning capacity under current circumstances, but there is a significant potential that the injury will
cause diminished capacity under future conditions”).
25. This is also true in those jurisdictions of the US where workers’ compensation schemes are
based on the market solution of mandatory liability insurance. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.34,
at 159–60; LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 58–63.
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jurisdiction, either propose a settlement or enter a binding decision. While
such decisions may always be challenged in a court of law, such nonjudicial processes help to settle the majority of disputes without court
intervention and thus lowers the overall administrative costs of workers’
compensation systems as compared to the tort system.26
F. Immunity of Employers from Damages Suits
The flipside of no-fault liability of workers’ compensation carriers for
the consequences of work-related injuries and diseases is employer
immunity.27 If, after obtaining workers’ compensation benefits, the worker
could bring private claims against her employer, the worker would receive
double compensation. Conversely, employers would have not only to fund
the system of workers’ compensation but also to shoulder the costs of
individual damages claims brought against them. The costs of this double
recovery would eventually have to come out of the pockets of the
employees themselves who would have to accept lower wages. For these
reasons, workers’ compensation systems generally bar individual actions
against employers, making the claim against the workers’ compensation
carrier the sole remedy.
There are several ways for victims to escape the limitations of
workers’ compensation benefits and to recover full tort damages. One is to
rely on the exceptions to the principle of employer immunity that many
legal systems allow in cases of aggravated fault.28 Another path that leads
out of the immunity principle, which has been used extensively in the
United States, is to sue third parties (other than the employer), which
contributed to the injury or disease. The incentive to collect fully
compensatory and additional punitive damages explains the surge in suits
against manufacturers of industrial installations, equipment, tools, and raw
materials, in cases involving workplace accidents and occupational
diseases.29

26. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
27. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 6.35, at 166–72 (describing
conditions for employer immunity in the United States); Code de la sécurité sociale [Social Security
Code] Art. L451-1 (Fr.) (providing for employer immunity in France for damages for injuries and
diseases as described therein); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 381 (describing
conditions for employer immunity in France); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 234–36. (describing
conditions for employer immunity in Germany).
28. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–6, § 6.36, at 174–76.
29. Infra, Part VI C.
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II. EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY: BASIC FEATURES
A. Liability in Contract and Tort
The basic elements of workers’ compensation systems have been set
out above. The alternative is a system of more or less pure employers’
liability. In such a world, the employer is personally liable for the damage
sustained by his employees, in the same way that he is liable to third
parties. It is a matter of argument whether such liability would result in a
contractual claim or in a claim in tort. Civil law systems will ground the
action primarily or even exclusively in the law of contract,30 i.e., in the
employment contract. In contrast, common law jurisdictions (like England)
seem to base it on tort, albeit with strong contractual flavors.31
B. Four Features of Private Liability Systems
While the differences between a contract and a tort approach may be
important in theory, they remain inconsequential in practice. Under both
theories, liability for the consequences of workplace accidents and
occupational diseases shares four common features of private claims for
damages:32 First, the responsibility of the employer is based on fault, i.e. on
a failure to take the requisite care in the organization of the business and of
the work flow, the equipment of the workplace, and the training of workers.
Second, where liability has been established, the defense of contributory
negligence remains available to the defendant. Third, however, if the victim
succeeds, she is entitled to full compensation of pecuniary and
nonpecuniary losses. Damages are calculated in every single case and not
awarded on the basis of statutory schedules and grids. Fourth, disputes are
resolved by the civil courts, without prior involvement of ADR-like dispute
resolution boards.
C. The Trinity of Defenses
These four features of employers’ liability each pose rich and highly
complex sets of sub-issues that are absent from workers’ compensation
30. SIEWERT D. LINDENBERGH, ARBEIDSONGEVALLEN EN BEROEPSZIEKTEN, 10, ¶ 7.2 (2nd ed.
2009) (Ger.) (citing Art. 7:658 Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek [NBW] [Civil Code] (Ger.).; Cour de
Cassation [Cass.] (supreme court for judicial matters) soc., Oct. 11, 1994, D. [Recueil Dalloz] 1995,
440 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Oct. 28, 1997, D. 1998,
219 (Fr.); JEAN PÉLISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT & ANTOINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU TRAVAIL [LABOR LAW],
¶986 (22nd ed. 2004).
31. See Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., Ltd. v. English, [1938] A.C. 57 (H.L.) 78 (U.K.); Harris v.
Brights Asphalt Contractors, [1953] 1 Q.B. 617 at 626; W. V. HORTON ROGERS, WINFIELD &
JOLOWICZ ON TORT, 413–15, 424–27 (18th ed. 2010).
32. Cf. ROGERS, supra note 31, at 424–38.
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systems. The requirement of establishing fault on the part of the employer
requires courts to set the requisite standard of care, which may be a
difficult determination to make. Another complex task is to determine the
scope of liability in cases where the harm was caused by the negligence of
a fellow employee,33 and when the employee was guilty of contributory
negligence.34 The well-established tort doctrines of vicarious liability and
contributory fault provided anchors for the holy—or, rather, “unholy”—
trinity of defenses available to the employer under late–nineteenth-century
law: the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory
negligence.35 The scope of vicarious liability of employers for harm caused
by one employee to another had been seriously curtailed by the so-called
“doctrine of common employment” or the “fellow-servant rule,” which
exonerated the employer from liability for workplace accidents caused by
another member of the workforce, provided that the fellow employee was
not charged with organizing and ensuring the safety of the workplace. Even
where the victim succeeded in establishing a prima facie case against the
employer, she was still subject to the defenses of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence. Thus, the injured employee lost her claim for
compensation if the accident in question involved negligence on her own
part, but also where it appeared to be a natural consequence of the general
risk caused by the plant or operation in question.
Interestingly, the two European jurisdictions that revived employers’
liability and abandoned workers’ compensation were careful to leave the
unholy trinity of defenses dormant in their graves.36 In the modern law of
employers’ liability in England and the Netherlands, respondeat superior
has trumped the “fellow-servant rule,” assumption of risk has been
abolished, and contributory fault has been limited to a narrow set of cases
involving egregious behavior by the employee.
D. Full Compensation
If the claimant succeeds in establishing the elements of liability, she is
entitled to full compensation of losses incurred, including damages for pain
33. Id. at 374.
34. Id. at 384.
35. Id. at 363–88; Richard Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1982) (“During the nineteenth century . . . negligence
was regarded as the proper basis of liability, the requirements of the employee’s prima facie case were
not the principal issue. Instead the legal battle raged over the famous trinity of defenses: contributory
negligence of the employee, assumption of risk and common employment.”). The situation under the
old law is nicely described in New York Cent. R.R.Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, at 198–201 (1917)
(holding that New York state’s workers’ compensation act did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
36. See infra Part IV.C.
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and suffering and loss of amenities. Lost earnings will be replaced in full,
with the size of the award depending exclusively on the decrease in
earnings caused by the accident or disease. This calculation requires
difficult projections about the earning prospects of the claimant in the
impaired versus the hypothetically unimpaired state of the world. In legal
systems that permit punitive damages, the victim of a tort may recover
damages in excess of her loss, provided that the defendant is guilty of
aggravated fault, i.e., acted recklessly or with an intention to harm others.
E. Dispute Resolution through Litigation
Disputes that cannot be resolved by the parties out of court are dealt
with under the normal procedures of the civil justice system. While these
may seem adequate or even superior to the services of special tribunals set
up to dispose of claims brought in workers’ compensation, they consume
more resources, and they take much longer to dispose of a case.37
F. No Insurance and Collectivization of Claims
Private systems of liability, regardless of whether they are based on
contract or tort, are powerless to ensure the actual satisfaction of claims for
damages. The victim bears the risk that, at the time of suit or judgment, the
tortfeasor or other responsible party may no longer exist or may be
insolvent. While the risk of insolvency could be captured by a statutory
mandate to take out liability insurance, there is no general duty on firms to
do so. Even if such a duty were introduced, it would be powerless to deal
with situations where the employee switched from one employer to the next
over the course of her worklife so that it is impossible to attribute the loss
to one particular employer and his insurance carrier.
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
The choice between workers’ compensation and employers’ liability
involves a whole range of complex policy issues. For the purpose of
analyzing these issues, economic analysis offers by far the most elaborate
and systematic framework. Surprisingly, however, workers’ compensation
has remained a rather barren spot within the landscape of economic
analysis. While the topic was discussed in the early days of law-andeconomics scholarship,38 modern treatments are generally lacking. Given
37. See infra Part IV.C.
38. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 44–46, 67–71 (1972);
James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability
Systems, 5 J. LEGAL. STUD. 293, 298–307 (1976); see also Price V. Fishback, Liability Rules and
Accident Prevention in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century, 16 J.
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the preference of economic theory for market solutions and private
ordering, it seems that workers’ compensation systems, which substitute
the individual action against the employer with a claim against a private or
public insurance carrier and even dispense with the defense of comparative
negligence are unattractive. However, a closer analysis reveals that things
are not as simple and that workers’ compensation systems may indeed fare
much better than anticipated.
A. Efficient Deterrence
1. Efficient Deterrence from a Torts Perspective
Those jurisdictions that have replaced workers’ compensation and
revivified employers’ liability have universally adopted the fault principle.
It seems that this choice was made intuitively, without much reasoning
about the trade-offs involved. Lawmakers may have thought that faultbased employers’ liability was something of a natural supplement to the
protection granted by social insurance programs which, of course, do not
require the victim to establish wrongdoing on the part of someone.
In fact, the choice between liability rules is not that easy. Traditional
economic analysis suggests that the difference between fault-based and
strict liability does not affect incentives to take care.39 Under the
assumptions that courts set the standard of care at the efficient level,
injurers (employers) will be led to take care because doing so avoids
liability altogether. Confronted with the choice either to take efficient
precautions and bear the costs of these precautions or to take less than
efficient precautions and bear the costs of diminished precautions plus the
costs of accidents caused by his actions, the rational employer will take
efficient precautions. Under a rule of strict liability, the employer bears the
costs of any accidents caused in the course of employment without being
able to exonerate himself by establishing his diligence. However, he still
has an incentive to take care to the extent that the costs of precautions are
lower than the costs of accidents avoided by taking such precautions. In
other words, under strict liability the potential injurer has an incentive to
adhere to the same precautionary standard he would be held to under a
negligence regime. Therefore, both principles of attributing liability
theoretically work equally well with regard to care levels.
A second concern of liability rules is to generate efficient activity
LEGAL STUD. 305 (1987).
39. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–32 (1987) (discussing
basic theory of liability and deterrence); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 226–27
(8th ed. 2011).
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levels. The activity level denotes the amount or quantity of a potentially
dangerous activity, given a particular liability rule. The goal is to make sure
that potential injurers engage in dangerous activities only up to the point
where the gain from another unit of the activity is equal to the loss in terms
of additional accident costs, assuming that efficient care has been taken. In
the case of a business entity, the price charged for its goods and services
should reflect the full costs of production, including the costs of any harm
caused in the course of production.40 If the fault principle is applied, firms
would be able to deny responsibility for any damage caused, so long as
appropriate care had been taken. Since victims, not employers, would bear
the costs of the residual harm that was caused in spite of precautions, the
balance sheet of the firm would not reflect the full costs of production. Part
of the risks associated with the products and services offered by the firm
would be externalized to victims who sustained injuries as a consequence
of diligent behavior. In turn, firms would not need to account for these
costs in setting prices, thus causing prices for the goods and services
supplied to be too low. As demand is inversely correlated with price,
demand for such goods and services would be too high. In effect, the
economy would produce more goods and services than it should in light of
the total costs of production, including the damage caused to third parties.
In order to avoid the misallocation of resources implicit in excessive
demand, “the cost of the production should bear the blood of the
workman.”41 Thus, in returning those costs from the victim to the firm in
order to generate efficient activity levels, a regime of strict employer
liability seems to be preferable to its fault-based alternative.
2. Efficient Deterrence in Employment Relationships
a) Coasean Bargaining
The line of argument sketched above ignores the fact that workplace
accidents and occupational diseases are different from ordinary tort cases,
for the reason that victim and injurer are in a contractual relationship with
one another. This feature is important, because in a setting where
transactions costs, including the costs of information, are zero, the parties
will invariably reach the efficient result through bargaining, regardless of
the initial placement of liability. The attribution of costs associated with a
particular liability rule, if efficient, will be replicated in the bargain of the
parties or, if inefficient, will be pushed aside. In essence, this is the
40. SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 48–51.
41. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 573 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote
omitted).
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reasoning that became known as the Coase theorem.42
Applied to the employment contract, the question is how the employer
and employee would allocate the risk of workplace accidents and
occupational diseases if they made this issue the subject of their bargain.
Take first the example of a system where employers are immune from
liability. If both employer and employee are perfectly informed about the
probability and severity of harm, the wage negotiated by the parties will
include a premium that reflects the expected value of the harm.43 Wage
premiums that accurately reflect the level of expected harm are equivalent
to damages payments due under a liability system. They increase the costs
of production by the expected costs of harm and generate incentives to
drive down overall costs by reducing expected harm. The employer may
reduce expected harm in the two ways familiar from tort analysis: (1) by
taking precautions; or (2) by reducing activity levels, i.e., by hiring fewer
workers. Where the wage plus the premium necessary to induce employees
to accept a given level of risk is higher than the value generated by the
work of this particular employee, the employer will abstain from hiring.
This, in fact, is precisely what the efficient employer should do. Thus,
under the assumption that the parties to the employment relationship are
perfectly informed about the risk of harm involved in the job at issue, the
employer faces the right incentives to take care and to adjust the activity
level so that optimal deterrence obtains.
The presence of a liability scheme alters the dynamics of the parties’
negotiations as the employee discounts the expected costs imposed by
workplace accidents and occupational diseases by an amount equal to the
expected damages payments due to him in case of injury. If the risk of
injury is held constant and all else is equal, the presence of liability will
reduce the wage premium paid under the respective employment contract,
as the demand for labor depends on the total costs of employment and not
only on the cash wages received by the employee.44 Obviously, the effect
that the expected costs of compensating workers reduce aggregate salary
(wage plus premium) is independent from the nature of the liability regime
in question, whether it is workers’ compensation or employers’ liability.
42. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
43. MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS:
WAGES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 13–20 (1990) (describing wage-risk
tradeoffs, where research “indicate[s] that market mechanisms play a fundamental role in determining
both the allocation of workers to jobs and their compensation in those jobs”).
44. See MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 22–23 (describing wage-benefit tradeoffs in the role
of workers’ compensation); empirical evidence of the passing on of the costs of liability to nonunion
workers in the mining industry is presented in Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, Did Workers
Pay for the Passage of Workers’ Compensation Laws?, 110 Q. J. ECON. 713, 714 (1995).
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The reduction in the wage premium will certainly be more pronounced
where liability is strict and generous damages are offered, and less
pronounced where liability is contingent on a showing of fault and damages
are under-compensatory. In addition, the costs involved in the
administration of a compensation system will depress wage premiums, too.
More efficient systems of liability will, therefore, lead to higher damages
levels or to higher wages than less efficient ones. All that can be said from
this perspective is that employers and employees would prefer more costefficient liability systems to less cost-efficient ones.
In conclusion, the liability rule does not seem to matter at all. Absent
liability, the higher the risk of injury caused by a given job, the higher the
wage premium will be that the employee is able to negotiate, and vice
versa. Firms will always internalize the full costs of accidents and diseases,
either in the form of wage premiums to be paid to all members of the
workforce ex ante, or in the form of damages payments paid to those
actually injured ex post or in any combination of both.45 From this
perspective, a system of no liability generates the same incentives to take
care and to adjust activity levels as a system of fault-based or strict liability
employers’ liability would.
b) Bargaining in the Real World
Note, however, that this conclusion only holds where transaction costs
are negligible. In the real world, such low- or zero-cost situations are rare.
Major sources of transaction costs are the costs of gathering, processing,
and analyzing information that is relevant to the transaction at stake.46
Where at least one of the parties lacks relevant information, bargaining
may not lead to efficient outcomes. The efficient allocation of the costs of
harm caused by workplace accidents and occupational diseases by means
of contract turns on the ability of the employee to perceive the risk
associated with a particular job, to translate it into a number equal to the
costs of expected harm, and to calculate a wage premium that reflects the
costs of expected harm due to occur within the period of time for which the
wage is paid, e.g. a week or a month. While substantial empirical literature
shows that wage premiums compensating workers for occupational hazards
are in fact paid,47 the existence of wage premiums as such does not prove

45. MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 53-68.
46. DAVID DE MEZA, Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 270, 275-278 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
47. For a summary of this literature, see Alison Morantz, Opting Out of Workers’ Compensation
in Texas, a Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION:
PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 197, 208–09 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011),
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that they adequately reflect the risks of harm associated with various jobs.
This fact is acknowledged by the empirical literature itself, which concedes
that the results obtained from studies “indicate that complete market failure
does not necessarily exist,”48 but they “do not prove that risk is allocated
efficiently by the labor market.”49 The extent of market failure due to
misinformation about risk and other defects in the bargaining process
remains unknown.
For the purposes of the present analysis it is unnecessary to explore
further the potential of employer–employee bargaining to incentivize the
employer to take care and to adjust the activity level efficiently. That
question remains open to empirical analysis on the degree to which workers
are well-informed and successfully able to bargain for wage premiums.
Rather, the crucial question to ask is whether a system combining a rule of
employer immunity with wage premiums produces more efficient
incentives than does a rule of strict liability.
As a matter of policy, the first option of strict liability is preferable.50
The employer is better positioned than the employee to gather information
about occupational hazards and to control them by taking precautions and
adjusting activity levels. While it is certainly true that employees might be
better informed with regard to the risk posed by fellow employees whose
behavior they may closely observe on a day-to-day basis,51 the employer
enjoys informational advantages in all other areas. The employer controls
the use of machinery and other equipment, of raw materials and energy, as
well as the time, duration, and environmental conditions of dangerous
activities. Given their superior information about risks posed by the factors
and circumstances of production, employers can rationally weigh the costs
and benefits of one course of action against another. To draw on the
example of asbestos, it is (or was) the employer who decided to use this
material and who controlled the circumstances of its use—e.g., the duration
of exposure, the prompt removal of dust through ventilation, the provision
of protective clothes and breathing aids, and the supply of showers. Each of
these factors influenced the likelihood that dealing with asbestos on the job
would result in the contraction of a serious disease such as asbestosis and
mesothelioma.
In contrast, workers will tend to have less knowledge about the
occupational hazards to which they are exposed, since they have no
systematic overview of the accidents and diseases caused by certain
48.
49.
50.
51.

MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 15.
Id.
MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 121-35.
Posner, supra note 38, at 44-45.
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activities. Rather, their informational resources are usually restricted to
anecdotal evidence gathered on the particular job. While this may be
valuable, it may not be representative of the larger picture. And even where
workers have the relevant information about the risks of injury and disease
to which they are exposed, they lack the means for adequate and
proportionate responses. During their employment contract, workers’
bargaining leverage is only based on the threat of “quitting.” While
empirical studies have shown that the decision to quit or stay is in fact
influenced by concerns of workplace safety,52 it has never been suggested
that these decisions generate optimal incentives to take care on the part of
employers. Indeed, such a claim could not be made, since most workers
will lack relevant information and because the decision to quit or stay is
often influenced by a range of factors other than workplace risk, such as the
supply of labor, as expressed in the unemployment rate, and the mobility of
the worker, which in turn is influenced by the housing market as well as the
personal situation of the worker and her family at their current location.
The analysis so far suggests that employers will be in a better position
to gather information about and control occupational risks than workers.
However, a bilateral comparison that focuses only on the two parties
involved in the employment relationship is misplaced. In reality, workers
may be supported by trade unions, while employers will act under the
guidance of liability insurers. The empirical literature on labor markets
suggests that unionized workers receive higher wages and higher workers’
compensation benefits, but it remains ambivalent whether the presence of
unions increases workplace safety.53 Studies on safety standards in the
mining industry seem to support the conclusion that unions have a positive
effect on workplace safety in that their presence drives down accident
rates.54
At the other end of the spectrum, the employer does not operate in
isolation either. There is, of course, a layer of regulatory safety standards
set by administrative agencies or other regulators, but these may be
disregarded in the present context, as regulatory standards affect the
behavior of employers and employees alike. While regulation of workplace
safety is important, none of the jurisdictions surveyed relies exclusively on
regulation. Rather, they operate dual systems of safety regulation and
financial incentives generated by liability rules like those underlying
workers’ compensation schemes as well as employers’ liability regimes.
52. MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 98-110.
53. Id. at 111-20.
54. Alison Morantz, Coal Mine Safety: Do Unions Make a Difference?, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-5) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1846700).
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Beyond employees and regulators, liability insurers also supervise and
control the employers they insure. Unlike first-party health and disability
insurers, which are powerless to control occupational hazards, liability
insurers have the means and—thanks to competition in the insurance
market—the incentive to risk-rate employers adequately.55 Commercial
liability insurers estimate the risk associated with the potential insured
before underwriting, and they adjust premiums ex post through experience
rating and retrospective rating for premiums to more finely reflect the
insured’s actual risk. The same strategies of assessing and rating individual
risk are employed by well-run workers’ compensation carriers.56 To the
extent that insurance or workers’ compensation carriers succeed in setting
premiums that adequately reflect risk, the incentives to take care and adjust
activity levels generated by a rule of strict liability remain intact. With
regard to emerging risks, which are yet unknown, the presence of liability
insurers may even improve incentives over the ones that would exist
otherwise. By insuring large numbers of firms, industrial liability insurers
not only pool the risks associated with the operation of these firms, but they
also pool information with regard to the risks involved. Such pooling of
information is particularly valuable with regard to new risks which have
not yet been appreciated by the scientific and business communities.
In summary, employers and their liability insurers are in a better
position to search and gather information on occupational hazards and to
act upon such information than workers, even if the latter are organized in,
and assisted by, trade unions. This is not to say that workers and unions are
never able to learn about occupational hazards and act accordingly, or that
employers and their insurers know everything and take appropriate safety
measures. Rather, the foregoing analysis merely suggests that employers
and liability insurers (and, for that matter, workers’ compensation carriers)
are in a relatively better position to act in the interest of safety. Even under
optimistic assumptions, it is difficult to imagine how the wage premium
implicit in an employment contract could fluctuate over time so as to fairly
accurately track and reflect changes in workplace safety that occur over the
course of the employment relationship. In effect, wages would have to
fluctuate much like premiums under liability insurance contracts in order to
achieve the same incentives to control risk on the part of the employer. It is
reasonable to assume that such dynamic matching of wages and job risks is
55. Gerhard Wagner, Tort Law and Liability Insurance, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 377, 38687 (Michael G. Faure ed., 2010).
56. Cf. LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 98-104; MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 25; Hein Kötz &
Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Schadensverhütung durch ökonomische Anreize: Eine empirische Untersuchung,
189 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP] 501 (1989) (describing the German System).

WAGNER_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012

TORT, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND NO-FAULT SCHEMES

1/9/2013 11:58 AM

21

not achieved in practice.
c) Empirical Evidence for the Efficiency of Workers’ Compensation
Systems
The conclusion that workers’ compensation systems do a better job
than the opposite rule of no liability finds support in empirical studies
comparing the accident rates under workers’ compensation with those
achieved under the systems of employers’ liability, which workers’
compensation replaced.57 With the introduction of workers’ compensation
schemes, the number of claims for minor injuries tended to rise, while the
death-rate and the number of serious injuries declined significantly.58 The
obvious explanation is that workers’ compensation, by introducing strict
liability and awarding benefits independent of actual loss, increased moral
hazard, leading to more frequent claims for minor injuries.59 Deaths and
serious injuries are much less likely to fall prey to moral hazard and are
therefore a much more reliable indicator of the performance of workers’
compensation systems. And it is precisely in this area of serious injuries
that these schemes shine, evidencing their beneficial effects on workplace
safety.
3. Efficient Employee Behavior
a) Irrelevance of Contributory Fault
Current systems of tort liability routinely provide for the defenses of
contributory or comparative negligence within regimes of strict liability.
Strikingly, workers’ compensation systems diverge from this practice and
follow the opposite rule of disallowing the defense of contributory fault,
save for narrow exceptions. The latter is understood here to encompass
both the doctrine of contributory negligence in a technical sense (which
bars the claim against the injurer upon the establishment of victim
negligence), and the doctrine of comparative negligence (which reduces the
57. For a summary of these studies, see DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 1, at 381-82.
Given that schemes providing for broad and generous protection of workers from occupational risk
generate both more moral hazard and stronger incentives to take care, and that the only observable data
for researchers are the number and value of claims, it is very difficult to isolate the effects of workers’
compensation schemes. Cf. Morantz, supra note 47 at 209-10. And even where it can be done, the
question remains: compared to what? Systems of employers’ liability vary widely, not only with regard
to the scope of liability and defences such as common employment and contributory negligence, but
also in the area of damages levels and enforcement. In Texas, for example, where employers may opt
out of workers’ compensation, practically all of the firms that used this option resorted to mandatory
arbitration for resolution of disputes. Cf. Morantz, supra note 47, at 223, 230.
58. MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 121-35.
59. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 377, 392-93 (1994).
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damages claim in proportion to the degree and weight of the victim’s
contribution).60 In contrast, workers’ compensation carriers are liable for
the financial consequences of the harm suffered by the victim regardless of
fault on the part of the employer, and regardless of negligence of the
employee-victim. The claim only fails if the victim inflicted the injury
upon herself intentionally.61 While some jurisdictions provide for a
reduction of the damages claims where the victim also acted recklessly or
inexcusably, generally courts seem very reluctant to apply this rule to reject
or reduce damages claims of employees.62
b) The Importance of Employee Behavior for Efficient Deterrence
From the perspective of deterrence, the defense of contributory
negligence is essential for regimes of strict liability to yield efficient
outcomes.63 General economic theory maintains that a regime of strict
liability lacking the defense of contributory fault leads to undesirable
outcomes, i.e., too many accidents, within settings of bilateral causation.
The case of occupational hazards clearly involves a situation where both
the potential injurer and the potential victim may affect the probability and
severity of accidents through their respective behavior. While the employer
chooses the equipment and raw materials, as well as the organization of the
workplace and of the production process, the day-to-day operations inside
the plant engage the employee. Without the diligent cooperation of
workers, safe working conditions are impossible to achieve. Although the
employee typically operates within the sphere of the employer, constant
supervision and control are impossible. Therefore, the law needs to
incentivize both parties, employer and employee, to take precautions in
order to achieve the goal of optimal workplace safety. Against this
background, it is all the more striking that workers’ compensation systems
hold employers strictly liable without holding employees accountable for
contributory fault. It may seem that employees in their role as potential
victims lack any incentive to take care, and will therefore fail to take
efficient precautions to avoid the injury in the first place.

60. Cf. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 494-506.
61. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, CRAVER, SCHROEDER & SHOBEN, supra note 8, § 6.11 (regarding the
US policy on intentional workplace injuries); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at ¶ 586 (regarding the
German policy on intentional workplace injuries); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8,
at ¶ 387 (regarding the French policy on workplace injuries intentionally caused by the victim).
62. See, e.g., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Jan. 27, 2004,
Bull. civ. II, No. 25; Cass. ass. plén. [supreme court for judicial matters, en banc], Jun 24, 2005, JCPS
(Jurisclasseur Périodique Social) 2005, 1056; LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, at ¶
387.
63. SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 9-21.
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c) Justifying the Disregard for Contributory Negligence
There are several explanations that mitigate the tension between
economic principles and the set-up of workers’ compensation. First,
incentives to avoid loss may be less important where injury or other harm
to one’s own body is concerned.64 Most workers have an intrinsic incentive
to avoid losing an arm, a leg or an eye, even if they are promised sizable
financial compensation. This is not to deny that full employer liability
without regard to contributory fault does weaken the incentives on the part
of workers to take care. Evidence from no-fault schemes in the area of
traffic accidents suggests that there is a detrimental effect on potential
victims’ incentives to take care.65 The point is only that this effect may be
smaller than it would be with other kinds of harm such as property damage
or financial losses.
Second, it is misleading to think of the payments available under
workers’ compensation as the “fair price” paid in exchange for inflicting
the harm in question. The bargain implicit in workers’ compensation
schemes involves a broad liability rule and a rather parsimonious quantum
rule. The worker who suffered harm never recovers in full; she receives
compensation of her financial losses only. In addition, the award of
damages is not assessed on a case-by-case basis but drawn from a schedule
of disabilities and associated benefits, regardless of the actual amount of
lost earnings incurred by the individual victim. For this reason, the liability
rule implicit in workers’ compensation has been described as one of
“shared strict liability”;66 a better characterization would be “partial strict
liability.” Far from providing full compensation to the victim, workers’
compensation schemes provide limited compensation in the form of prefixed benefits and thus leave a significant part of the incentives to protect
oneself from bodily harm and disease intact.67
In spite of these optimistic findings, there is room for improvement.
As explained below, there is no systematic link between the level of
compensation and the associated degree of undercompensation, on one
hand, and the preservation of the worker’s incentives to take care, on the
other.68 If anything, current workers’ compensation systems generate a
backwards incentive structure. As the system is set up today, victims of
minor injuries stand to receive damages in excess of the harm caused, while
64.
65.
studies).
66.
67.
68.

MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 29.
DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 1, at 25-26, 415-16 (summarizing empirical
Chelius, supra note 38, at 300-01.
Epstein, supra note 35, at 800-01.
See infra Part VI.B.
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those who suffer serious harm are being undercompensated. However, the
prospect of receiving compensation will more severely impact the victim’s
incentives to take care in cases of minor injuries than in cases involving
major ones. In addition, minor injuries are particularly vulnerable to ex post
moral hazard in the form of false claims and fake injuries. Therefore,
limited liability in the form of undercompensation is required most in cases
of minor injuries, not major ones, but it is precisely here that the system
fails. A decrease in benefits for minor injuries would mitigate these
problems, and therefore benefit the overall viability of the system.69
With regard to serious injuries, it is essential to focus on the basic
justification for the system’s disregard for contributory fault. It rests on the
recognition that, since mistakes and lapses of attention are inevitable in
day-to-day life, allowing the contributory negligence defense, or its
comparative negligence companion, would lead to decreased damages
claims in routine cases.70 This concern is particularly acute in the area of
occupational risks: since workers spend a large part of their lives at work, it
is a statistical certainty that even the most diligent worker will make
mistakes and have momentary lapses of concentration once in a while.
Furthermore, the worker is typically not in a position to take durable
precautions that minimize the risk of lapses and mistakes as it is the
employer who controls the organization, equipment, and staffing of the
workplace.71 If these considerations form the basis for excluding the
contributory negligence defense, then it would make sense to limit this
exclusion to cases of simple negligence, i.e., a lapse or mistake that, in
itself, could and should have been avoided but that belongs to a class of
lapses and mistakes that will inevitably occur over the course of a worklife. Conversely, the defense of comparative negligence should be
available, and damages claims of victims be reduced, where the behavior
cannot be excused as an unavoidable lapse of concentration but rather
involves conscious disregard of safety rules and the standards of reasonable
69. For details, see infra Part VI.B.
70. Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., [1940] A.C. 152 (H.L) 178-79 (Lord
Wright) (appeal from Eng.): “What is all-important is to adapt the standard of what is negligence to the
facts, and to give due regard to the actual conditions under which men work in a factory or mine . . . .
The policy of the statutory protection would be nullified if a workman were held debarred from
recovering because he was guilty of some carelessness or inattention to his own safety, which though
trivial in itself threw him into the danger consequent on the breach by his employer of the statutory
duty.”); see also Staveley Iron & Chem. Co. Ltd. v Jones, [1956] A.C. 627 (H.L) 648 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
71. As to the distinction between durable and nondurable precautions and the risks of inattention,
thoughtlessness and forgetfulness that disproportionately affect the latter, see Mark F. Grady, Why are
People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82
Nw. U.L. Rev. 293, 302-10 (1988).
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behavior. The crucial question is whether the worker made a conscious
decision to engage in unreasonable behavior or whether the accident was
caused by an unconscious lapse of concentration. The Georgia Supreme
Court succinctly described the necessary elements in holding that “willful
misconduct includes all conscious or intentional violations of definite law
or rules of conduct, as distinguished from inadvertent, unconscious, or
involuntary violations.”72
While it seems that no jurisdiction running a workers’ compensation
system openly embraces the distinction between unavoidable lapses of
concentration and conscious disregard for safety, they differ as to their
resistance to such an approach. Where the claim of the worker may only be
denied upon proof of intentional infliction of harm, it remains difficult to
interpret this exception in ways compatible with the proposition made here.
Workers’ compensation systems which allow for the rejection of claims
where it is established that the worker acted in conscious disregard of
safety rules and safety instructions, are much more amenable to a
functional reinterpretation of that concept in light of the distinction
between statistically unavoidable lapses of attention and conscious
disregard of safety requirements. The same is true for systems like the
French one, which expand the exception to cases of inexcusable negligence
and allow for a mere reduction of the workers’ claims. To the present day,
however, the French courts are unwilling to apply the clause vigorously,73
as would preserve the incentives of workers to take care and to avoid
harm.
B. Efficient Risk Bearing
1. Wage Premiums and Strict Liability Compared
Regimes of no liability and strict liability differ from one another not
only with regard to efficient deterrence, but also in how they assign the
residual risk of harm, i.e., the risk that remains even after efficient
precautions have been taken. Strict liability functions like an insurance plan
offered by an employer to its workers. Whenever the worker suffers losses
as a consequence of workplace accidents or occupational diseases, the
employer is liable to compensate her. The risk of accidents and disease, at
least as to their financial consequences, is borne by the employer.
Under a rule of no liability the employee bears the risk of workplace
accidents and occupational diseases. Whenever such a risk materializes and
72. Roy v. Norman, 404 S.E.2d 117, 118 (Ga. 1991) (emphasis omitted). Regrettably, the court
made this definition part of a four-prong test rather than making it conclusive. See id.
73. See supra note 62.
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results in a serious injury or disease, the worker receives no redress from
her employer, because she has already been compensated for her loss in the
form of wage premiums collected through the months and years preceding
the accident or illness.
The decision between the two regimes of no liability and strict liability
seems to be straightforward. It is reasonable to assume that workers will
generally be risk averse with regard to the potentially dire consequences of
accidents and diseases.74 Therefore, they would prefer to be insured against
the risk of such harm. This is precisely what a system of strict liability
provides for; it requires employers to insure their employees against
personal injury. It does not matter that employers may be risk averse too, as
they in turn can shift the risk of liability to a liability insurer in exchange
for a premium.
The conclusion that strict liability is preferable on grounds of risk
allocation is still premature, however. First, it ignores the fact that the
worker need not insure the risk of harm with her employer; instead, she
might buy coverage for the costs of health care and for income replacement
on the insurance market. At the time when workers’ compensation schemes
were introduced in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, most
workers were unable to buy first-party insurance to protect themselves
against accidents and diseases for which the employer could not be held
liable.75 At that time, the introduction of workers’ compensation clearly
contributed to efficient risk bearing. Today, this situation has changed, as
health insurance and disability insurance are well-established lines of the
insurance industry and readily available for (almost) everyone who
demands them. Within the wage premium model, workers will negotiate a
higher wage for accepting increased risks of injury or disease and then turn
around and use this premium to cover the risk of such contingencies by
taking out first-party health and disability insurance. Thus, from the
perspective of the risk-averse worker, the choice is not really between
insurance or no insurance, but between insurance on account of the
employer and bundled together with the contract for employment or market
insurance bought on the market and paid for with the help of wage
premiums due under the employment contract.76
A second reason why strict liability need not be superior to no liability
in terms of risk allocation is that employers might be risk-averse. To the
extent that this is true, a rule of no liability is superior because it lets harms
74. SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 189.
75. Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, Precautionary Savings, Insurance, and the
Origins of Workers’ Compensation, 104 J. POL. ECON. 419 (1996).
76. See infra Part IV.A2.
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lie where they fall and thus preserves risk spreading, while strict liability
leads to a pooling of risks in the lap of the respective employer. But again,
this conclusion ignores the availability of insurance, this time in the form of
liability insurance. Risk-averse employers may easily cover the risk of loss
in the insurance market, while risk-neutral employers will choose to selfinsure. In this regard, workers’ compensation does not make a difference
since it works much like liability insurance. In fact, most U.S. jurisdictions
operate workers’ compensation systems within a market setting: the
insurance industry covers the liabilities of employers under workers’
compensation schemes.77
As a consequence, the real options are strict employer liability plus
liability insurance or workers’ compensation, on the one hand, and
employer immunity plus wage premiums negotiated by workers, on the
other. More precisely, the search for the optimal liability system for
workplace accidents and occupational diseases reduces to a binary choice
between two systems: One contains the elements of (1) strict liability, (2)
liability insurance, and (3) no wage premiums. In the alternative system,
(1) the employer faces no liability, but (2) pays wage premiums reflecting
the risk of harm, which (3) the employee then applies to the premiums due
under health and disability insurance policies bought on the market. In
today’s economy, which includes well-developed insurance markets for
both first-party health and disability insurance and third-party liability
insurance, the policy of efficient risk allocation seems to yield inconclusive
results. As both parties can insure the risk in question, a comparison of the
risk attitudes of the parties concerned does not lead to a definitive answer.
This does not mean the choice between strict liability and no liability
should disregard efficient risk spreading altogether; rather, the analysis
must focus on choosing, or at least facilitating the use of, the most efficient
insurance mechanism. In this regard, and with a view to occupational
hazards, a rule of strict liability is preferable because it better combines the
objectives of efficient deterrence and efficient insurance. As explained
above, the denial of employers’ liability would distort the employers’
incentives to take care and thus undermine workplace safety.78 Workers
and their first-party insurers cannot effectively control and reduce the ex
ante risks of workplace injury. By contrast, under strict liability, employers
and their liability insurers would do a better job of providing workplace
safety than workers and their health and disability insurers could. For the
same reasons, liability insurance for employers would be more efficient and

77. See supra Part II.B notes 12-15.
78. See supra Part IV.A.2b), c).
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available at lower prices than first-party insurance for workers.
2. Fault-Based Liability vs. Strict Liability
The goal of efficient risk bearing also informs the choice between
strict liability and liability for fault. With regard to efficient deterrence, it
has been argued that strict liability is more desirable for its capacity to
facilitate allocative efficiency in the market: Strict liability makes the
employer internalize the full costs of production, which leads to truthful
prices.79 Consumer demand responds to these prices, causing employers to
produce only the efficient amount of a given good or service. From the
perspective of efficient allocation of risk within a world of highly
developed insurance markets, liability regimes that depend on fault suffer
from their failure to clearly assign the risk of harm. While the principles of
no liability and strict liability arrive at clear and wholesale—if opposing—
attributions of risk, regimes of fault-based liability are more ambiguous. If
the employer takes the precautions necessary to comply with the standard
of care, the employee bears the remaining risk of harm, while, if the
employer fails to take the necessary precaution, the employer bears the all
risk himself. In allowing for different outcomes that assign the risk in
opposing ways, fault-based liability systems typically create a demand for
insurance on both ends of the relationship. The employer will cover the risk
imposed on him through liability insurance, and the employee will shift the
remaining risk to health and disability insurers. The administrative costs of
a bilateral—and, therefore, duplicative—system of insurance will be higher
than the costs of an alternative system which creates a need only for one
party to seek out insurance.
The argument above may seem to be overblown, since third-party
liability insurance and first-party accident insurance exist together and
overlap in large areas anyway. Even though there is some variance in
degree among jurisdictions, most people are in fact insured against the
contingencies of injury and disease through health and disability insurers.
At the same time, most firms have covered the risk of being held liable
through third-party liability insurance. The lines of first-party and thirdparty insurance exist alongside each other everywhere, so the perceived
need to choose between one method of risk-pooling or the other is
unrealistic. By making occupational hazards the sole domain of liability
insurance or, equivalently, workers’ compensation, there may not seem to
be much to gain in terms of administrative cost savings. But this conclusion
ignores the fact that each area of overlap between liability and first-party

79. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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insurance creates the need for estimating and allocating the cost burden
associated with the harm in question to one side or the other. At the
intersection of fault-based employers’ liability and comprehensive health
and disability insurance, the costs of health insurance will depend in part on
the scope of employers’ liability, which in turn will be a function of the
way in which courts operate a fault-based liability system. The simpler way
to coordinate the two systems would be to allocate the full costs of
workplace accidents and occupational hazards to the employer and to allow
health and disability insurers to ignore these costs altogether.
In conclusion, the objective of efficient risk allocation does strongly
favor one liability regime over another in settings characterized by the
omnipresence of first-party and third-party insurance schemes for both
potential injurers and victims alike. Even so, the total administrative costs
of insurance will tend to be lower in an environment including strict
liability of employers for harm caused by occupational hazards than in an
alternative world of fault-based employers’ liability.
C. Efficient Administration of Claims and ex post Moral Hazard
1. The Advantage of Workers’ Compensation Systems
Assuming that a system of strict employers’ liability may be
justifiable and even desirable, the next question concerns the mode of
enforcement. In theory, there are many answers to this question, but in
reality there are only two practical solutions. One solution is the civil
justice system that is already in place in every jurisdiction and charged with
resolving disputes over damages claims generally. The alternative is to
devise a separate set of institutions specifically charged with compensating
victims of occupational hazards and processing their claims, avoiding the
involvement of the courts of general jurisdiction. The two alternatives
reflect the choice between systems of employers’ liability and systems of
workers’ compensation. The civil justice system is the natural choice in
search for an institution to resolve disputes that involve civil claims for
damages. Conversely, workers’ compensation systems require some
institutional grounding anyway, and these institutions are commonly
charged not only with administering the insurance mechanism, but also
with receiving petitions for compensation, with processing these petitions,
and with hearing disputes where they arise. In such systems, recourse to
courts of law is preserved as a means of last resort, and only after the
remedies available within the administrative system have been exhausted.
The choice between the judicial system and administrative boards as
mechanisms for dispute resolution is closely linked to the difference
between tort damages available upon the proof of fault and the more
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abstract assessment of damages regardless of fault in workers’
compensation systems. Establishing an employer’s negligence and
assessing damages in cases of personal injury are complex tasks that call
for a procedural mechanism that matches up to it. Judicial proceedings in
courts of law are the natural choice. In contrast, the liability of workers’
compensation carriers is strict and independent of contributory negligence,
rendering it unnecessary to set standards of care with regard to the behavior
of employers and employees. The assessment of damages in workers’
compensation does not require extensive fact-finding for the purpose of
establishing, upon the balance of probabilities, the loss in earnings caused
by the injury or disease in question. Rather, it suffices to establish the total
or partial disability of the claimant in terms of an impairment of earning
capacity and to then apply the rate of disability to the wages earned before
the accident in question.80 The task of assessing compensation is further
alleviated by schedules or scales that translate certain categories of harm
into percentage figures reflecting the degree of disability. The
determinations necessary to assess damages within such a system are
primarily of a medical nature and may thus be made by doctors, who in
turn work together with the dispute resolution boards of workers’
compensation institutions.
It is received wisdom that private liability systems, for all their
benefits, are very costly to operate. In fact, this is the assumption on which
the call for no-fault plans and their promise of low administrative costs has
always been based.81 Workers’ compensation is no exception; as Peter
Lencsis writes: “the delay and expense associated with lawsuits, attorneys,
and courts are among the evils that workers compensation is intended to
remedy.”82 The idea is that the sizable savings in administrative costs will
make the system more efficient because those in need of compensation will
receive a larger share of the payments made by injurers and their insurers.
The proposition that the operation of no-fault systems involves relatively
low administrative costs seems to hold up in practice. However, the
80. See KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 232-33 (describing German law); LAMBERT-FAIVRE
& PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, at ¶ 378 (describing French law); 2 LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR
LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DESK EDITION, Vol. 2, § 80.02 (2010) (describing
American law).
81. See, e.g., KEETON & O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 2, 69-71; STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING
AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS, at
xvii, 187-88 (1989); 1 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY, ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 30 (1991) (“Third-party tort insurance is extremely expensive
to administer. Individualized decisions must be made about each defendant’s fault and each plaintiff’s
losses, using all the procedural paraphernalia of the civil justice system. As a result, most of the claims
expenditure dollar pays for administration rather than ending up in the hands of the victim.”).
82. LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 58.
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numbers vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the UK, the
administrative costs of the industrial disablement benefit scheme are said to
be no more than 2 percent of benefit expenditures;83 the figure for general
social security schemes is 5 percent; while average administrative costs of
the tort system for personal injury claims routinely exceed damages,
sometimes by a factor of 1.8.84 In Germany, the administrative costs of the
workers’ compensation system are around 10.5 percent of total
expenditures.85 The latter includes not only the pure costs of processing
claims and resolving disputes, which together amount to no more than 1
percent of expenditures, but also the overall operating costs of the
respective agencies charged with occupational safety regulation and
oversight. In the United States, the share of administrative costs of
workers’ compensation institutions is between 15 percent and 20 percent of
total costs of claims,86 while the respective number for the tort system is
said to be between 50 percent and 55 percent of the total costs of claims.87
2. Containing ex post Moral Hazard and Abuse within Workers’
Compensation Systems
In spite of the variance within these numbers, they confirm the view
that workers’ compensation systems are much cheaper to operate than the
combination of tort and liability insurance. This alone does not prove that
the former outperform the latter, as it might be the case that the tort system
generates more accurate results than workers’ compensation systems. In
particular, the tort system might be better able to contain ex post moral

83. David Walters, An International Comparison of Occupational Disease and Injury
Compensation Schemes 5 (2009), available at http://iiac.independent.gov.uk/pdf/reports/
InternationalComparisonsReport.pdf.
84. LORD JUSTICE RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 16
para. 2.6 (2009) (regarding a sample of personal injury cases: “It can be seen that for every £1 which
the liability insurers paid out in damages, they paid out £1.80 in claimant costs.”); see also id. at ¶19.
4.4.
85. GESCHÄFTS-UND RECHNUNGSERGEBNISSE DER GEWERBLICHEN BERUFSGENOSSENSCHAFTEN
UND UNFALLVERSICHERUNGSTRÄGER DER ÖFFENTLICHEN HAND 2009 (Annual Report of the German
Association of Accident Insurers, DGUV) 56, 61 (2009), available at http://www.dguv.de/inhalt/
zahlen/documents/GuR_Broschuere_2009.pdf.
86. The most recent report of the National Academy of Social Insurance stipulates a benefits-tototal-costs-ratio of 0.73 for 2008, which means that for every dollar paid by employers, either as selfinsurers or in the form of insurance premiums under workers’ compensation, 73 cents went to injured
workers in the form of benefits. In other words, administrative expenses, including the administrative
costs and profits of insurance companies, amounted to 27 percent of total expenditures. See ISHITA
SENGUPTA, VIRGINIA RENO & JOHN F. BURTON, ,NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS, 2008, at 32 (2010), available at
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/Workers_Comp_Report_2008.pdf.
87. DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 1, at 393-94.
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hazard and risks of abuse. Ex ante moral hazard occurs when an agent who
is protected against the adverse consequences of harm, and whose behavior
cannot be monitored by the principal, takes fewer precautions against harm
than she otherwise would.88 One paradigmatic case is that victims who are
protected against losses by a rule of strict liability reduce their own efforts
to avoid the injury for which they will readily receive full compensation.
The standard response of the legal system is in the form of the defenses of
contributory or comparative negligence that allow courts to reject or reduce
claims where the victim’s behavior contributed to the harm complained of
and thereby shift part of the losses to the victim. As has been explained
above, this form of moral hazard may not be very significant within the
context of occupational hazards where the workers’ health and bodily
integrity is at stake and where the amount of compensation falls short of
actual losses.89 In this context, ex post moral hazard, which occurs after the
injury, at the stage of claiming damages or benefits, remains a concern and
tends to be much more significant.90 Where the liability of social insurance
schemes is in question, ex post moral hazard occurs when applicants fake
or exaggerate the severity of their injuries and diseases in order to be
classified as (partly) disabled and thus obtain benefits that they otherwise
would not have been eligible to receive.
Indeed, abuse and fraud seem to be a major risk associated with nofault insurance schemes of any kind. Abuse is the main explanation why
the Dutch system of public disability insurance proved unsustainable,91
why the American public disability insurance is said to be on the verge of
bankruptcy,92 and why the even broader scheme of accident insurance
established in New Zealand had to be reformed with the aim of restricting
access and scaling down benefits time and again.93 With a view to
compensation systems that focus on occupational risks, the Californian
88. See Morantz, supra note 43, at 207) (describing ex ante moral hazard as “risk-bearing moral
hazard”).
89. See supra, Part IV.A.3.
90. Morantz, supra note 54, at 3-4. (labeling ex post moral hazard as “claims-reporting moral
hazard”).
91. See infra Part V.B.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Richard Mahoney, New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme: A
Reassessment, 40 AM. J. COMP. LAW 159, 168 (1992); Richard S. Miller, The Future of New Zealand’s
Accident Compensation Scheme, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 45-638 (1989); Richard S. Miller, An Analysis
and Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV.
1070 (1993); Schwartz, supra note 59, at 420-22; PATRICK ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 183
(1997). But see Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187 (2008), for a
more optimistic view of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme. Information regarding the
plan may be found at http://www.acc.co.nz.
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system of workers’ compensation stands out as an example for waste,
fraud, and abuse.94 One major factor driving this abuse seems to be the
involvement of middlemen such as cappers, lawyers, and doctors who
collaborated in workers’ compensation mills and, in California, profited
from a local rule holding employers liable for the costs of medical
examinations even if the claim turned out to be invalid.95 The second major
cause for skyrocketing costs of workers’ compensation was the recognition,
by the competent courts, of compensable injuries and diseases, the
existence of which are difficult or even impossible to verify.96 Pertinent
examples include physical impairments such as back pain, whiplash and
soft-tissue back injuries, but also purely psychiatric or mental harm that
exists in the mind of the victim only. This is not to say that mental harm is
fictional and should never be compensated. However, courts must remain
sensitive to the problem that claims involving harm that is difficult to
verify are particularly vulnerable to abuse.
As these examples illustrate, the fact that workers’ compensation
systems restore financial losses only and fail to make the victim whole is
insufficient to fully discipline claimants and their advisers. Less-than-full
compensation may be good enough to check ex ante moral hazard but it is
rather ineffective against the dangers of ex post moral hazard: exaggerating
or fabricating injuries. On the other hand, lawmakers and administrators
must avoid throwing out the baby with the bathwater in making the claims
procedures in workers’ compensation too much like civil litigation. In the
eyes of some observers, this is the trap the old English version of workers’
compensation may have fallen into: “In no time at all, Workmens’
Compensation descended from its lofty ideals of being a no-fault social
service into a squalid legal battlefield between trade unions and insurance
companies, with lying, cheating and chicanery on all sides and
astronomical expenditure on administrative, legal and medical costs.”97
3. Balancing the Costs and Benefits of Controls against Abuse
While the two concerns of controlling ex post moral hazard and of
containing administrative costs incurred in the process of claims resolution
are clearly in conflict, the conflict does seem manageable in the real world.
Existing workers’ compensation systems seem to do a reasonable job at
containing ex post moral hazard without letting the costs of claims
94. Gary. T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Workers’ Compensation: The Recent
California Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983 (1993).
95. Id. at 1006-07.
96. Id. at 1001-03.
97. O.H. Parsons, A No-Fault System?: Not Proven, 3 INDUS. 129, 137 (1974).
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resolution spiral out of control. It seems that the clear, traceable, and
palpable attribution of costs to employers on which the funding
mechanisms of workers’ compensation systems are built leads to tighter
controls and more efficient claims resolution procedures than programs
funded out of general tax revenues and administered by an agency which is
not answerable to any distinct group with an interest in cost control. Where
workers’ compensation schemes have spiraled out of control, as was the
case in California in the 1990s, there were discrete and identifiable reasons
for these outcomes, namely lax rules which allowed for broad recognition
of nonverifiable diseases and the over-generous compensation of the costs
of medical examination.
These problems may be addressed and resolved in a satisfactory
manner. The risk of abuse can be reigned in by imposing (1) high
recognition thresholds for difficult-to-verify injuries and diseases, and (2) a
disciplined screening process that ensures that only genuine claims attract
awards. Given that the focus of workers’ compensation has always been on
physical injury and diseases caused by occupational hazards, these goals
are clearly within reach.
IV. REAL-WORLD CHOICES BETWEEN WORKERS’
COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY
A. The Motives for the Revival of Employers’ Liability
1. Getting Rid of the “Industrial Preference”
The economic analysis of workers’ compensation systems in the
previous part led to the conclusion that systems of workers’ compensation
may look rather attractive when compared to the alternative solution of
employers’ liability. In light of this finding, it is surprising that two modern
countries with advanced economies—the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands—defected from the dominant solution of providing a separate
liability regime for workplace accidents and occupational injuries, instead
re-embracing employers’ liability. The question is: why?
Certainly, in the Netherlands as well as in the UK, local political
predispositions and other contingent factors played a role. But there seems
to be a common theme, namely the idea that preferential treatment of
workers over nonworkers—the so-called “industrial preference”—is
unwarranted.98 This proposition assumes that workers’ compensation
98. For a contemporary explanation of industrial preference, see generally NICHOLAS J. WIKELEY
& ANTHONY I. OGUS, THE LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 717–18 (5th ed. 2005); Richard Lewis,
Consultation and Cuts: The Review of Industrial Injuries Benefit, 2 J. SOC. WELFARE L., 330, 333–34
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schemes operate within general systems of social security that protect every
citizen against financial losses incurred as a consequence of personal
injury, regardless of cause. Within such an environment, workers’
compensation systems have the effect of privileging workers over other
members of society. Workers gain access to benefits exceeding those
available under general programs of social security, such as health and
disability insurance, while members of the general public do not. This is
true even if the types of injury and the kinds of accident in question are
exactly the same. If someone falls from a ladder and breaks her leg while
painting a ceiling, she will be compensated if the accident happened at
work, in the course of her employment, while the same injury is left
uncompensated if the ceiling was in her own home and she painted it
during her leisure time. From the victim’s point of view and based on her
needs it is difficult to see the justification for the unequal treatment of these
two cases.99
In the context of disease, the difference in treatment accorded to the
same affliction is even more striking. Here the question is whether the
provision of health care, the replacement of lost earnings, and other
benefits, should depend on the cause of the disease at all. Health insurance
schemes, regardless of whether they are public or private, never look to the
causes of disease or injury, but provide assistance and care regardless of the
source that caused the need. Therefore, social-policy makers concerned
with satisfying needs should abandon cause-based distinctions as irrelevant.
The critical idea of lawmakers in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands, who worked to abandon workers’ compensation, was that the
financial needs created by bodily injuries and diseases are the same for
everyone. The general system of social security was to be designed
accordingly, treating every citizen equally and making the level of benefits
contingent on needs only. Thus, all that matters in these systems is the
severity of the injury or disease and the demand for medical treatment or
income replacement created by it.
2. Social Security as Basic Protection, Tort as a Supplement
In a world dominated by needs-based social security systems, the role
of tort law is merely supplemental. As social security satisfies the victim’s
basic financial needs, the private law of torts merely serves to provide
additional compensation that is not strictly necessary. Its primary function
(1980).
99. PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 355 (2006); JANE
STAPLETON, DISEASE AND THE COMPENSATION DEBATE (1986); WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at
717.
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is within the area of nonpecuniary losses, which always remain outside of
the scope of social insurance systems. This explains why in both
jurisdictions, in English and in Dutch law, the liability of the employer is
fault-based, not strict. Given that its primary function was to cover
nonpecuniary losses only, the selection of the fault principle makes sense,
as there is neither need nor justification to insure the victim on account of
the tortfeasor through a regime of strict liability.100 Thus, somewhat
surprisingly, systems of employers’ liability in practice do not depend
primarily or solely on the tort system to compensate victims, and in this
sense they are not “pure” tort systems at all. Rather, they combine broad
coverage of needs caused by bodily injuries and diseases under social
security schemes with the private tort action for additional damages.
The combination of these two approaches is particularly striking in the
law of the Netherlands. In 1967, the Netherlands, which had introduced its
workers’ compensation system in 1901 based broadly on the original
German model, abolished the system and reinstated the private cause of
action of employees against employers.101 However, the need to provide for
health care and income replacement within a short period of time after the
accident or injury had occurred—which led to the introduction of workers’
compensation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—
remained valid and urgent following abolition. The Dutch lawmakers
accommodated it by creating a general social insurance scheme that
provided for compensation in cases of disability, or incapacity to work,
regardless of cause. In effect, the Netherlands broadened one aspect of
workers’ compensation—expedient provision of health care and income
replacement—to include the population at large, while at the same time
abandoning other aspects of it—the preferential treatment of workers and
immunity of employers from tort actions. In essence, the Netherlands
replaced the system of workers’ compensation, which was focused on the
so-called professional risk (risque professionnel), with a combination of
generous social security benefits to cover the so-called social risk (risque
social), and supplementary employers’ liability.102
Likewise, the development in the United Kingdom must be seen in
light of the long-standing policy to create an all-encompassing welfare
system, funded out of general tax revenues and providing the same benefits

100. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 242-43 and 269-72
(2004).
101. LINDENBERGH, supra note 30, ¶ 2; Esther F. D. Engelhard, Shifts of Work-Related Injury
Compensation in 20 SHIFTS IN COMPENSATING WORK-RELATED INJURIES AND DISEASES 9, 41 (Saskia
Klosse & Ton Hartlief eds., 2007).
102. LINDENBERGH, supra note 30, ¶ 7.1–7.4; Engelhard, supra note 101, at 41–4.
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to every citizen. The intellectual framework for this approach was set out in
the Beveridge Report of 1942, which explicitly intended to overcome
“sectional interests” and to provide equal protection for every member of
society.103 In the years to follow, many of the proposals of the Beveridge
Commission were implemented, even though lawmakers did not always
follow their recommendations in detail, e.g., preferring flat contributions as
well as pre-fixed and flat benefits.104 The thrust of the Beveridge Report
was incompatible with the English version of workers’ compensation that
had been put in place in 1897, but had never eliminated the private action
against the employer. Consequently, the Beveridge Commission had
questioned the program’s preferential treatment of workers, but the
commission ultimately recommended its continuation.105 Parliament
followed this advice: it refused to altogether abandon workers’
compensation and instead opted for its reform in the guise of the National
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act of 1946.
To the present day, workers enjoy access to the industrial injuries
disablement benefit, which entitles victims of workplace injuries and
occupational diseases to pension or lump-sum payments.106 Eligibility
under the scheme does not depend on employer fault, and benefits remain
available even to those employees who contributed to the injury through
their own negligence.107 The amount of the industrial injuries disablement
benefit is regulated by statute and depends on the degree of disablement.108
Disputes are resolved by tribunals that operate outside of the civil justice
system and are said to be faster and more efficient than courts of law.
B. The Failure of Social Security
In both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the move away from
workers’ compensation and towards revivification of employers’ liability
was backed up by a rather generous social security mechanism, which was
designed to be the same for everyone, workers and nonworkers. In both

103. SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES ¶¶ 7–9 (1942) (U.K.);
see Engelhard, supra note 101, at 36–38.
104. BEVERIDGE REPORT, supra note 103, ¶ 80 (referencing a “flat rate of compensation for
disability”); see id. ¶ 304 (referencing a flat rate of insurance benefits, except with regard to losses
caused by industrial accident or disease).
105. Id. ¶ 80 (“If a workman loses his leg in an accident his needs are the same whether the
accident occurred in a factory or in the street.”). For a recent discussion [of the worker’s compensation
program,] see Stephen Jones, Social Security and Industrial Injury in SOCIAL SECURITY LAW IN
CONTEXT 461 (Neville Harris ed., 2000).
106. WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 759.
107. Id. at 741.
108. Id. at 753-59.
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countries, however, the high level of benefits initially available through
social security proved unsustainable in the long run.
In the United Kingdom, the industrial injuries compensation scheme,
as originally conceived, looked much like the lost-earnings-prong of
workers’ compensation systems that it intended to replace. While this
characterization was fairly accurate in 1946, it has become quite erroneous
today. Over time, the industrial injuries scheme was integrated into the
general social security system. Today, it is exclusively funded out of
general tax revenues, not through the contributions of employers.109 At the
same time, the level of benefits has gradually decreased. In 1982, the socalled injury benefit, which had compensated victims for short-term losses
of income caused by temporary disablement, was abolished in favor of a
combination of sick pay and benefits available under general social security
programs.110 Finally, pensions for lost earnings under the industrial injuries
benefit scheme were abolished altogether in 1990.111 While the scheme
continues to pay pensions, their amounts depend exclusively on the degree
of disablement rather than the victim’s income prior to the accident.112 The
maximum pension, paid out for 100% disability, amounts to no more than
£150 per week, less than $240.113 As a consequence, the so-called
disablement benefit is no longer a means to compensate lost wages at all,
but a means to compensate nonpecuniary loss, i.e. the loss of amenities
resulting from permanent or temporal, partial or full disablement.114 Today,
victims must rely on the protection under general social security to cover
their living expenses or resort to tort actions to restore their earnings in full.
In the Netherlands, the failure of social security is even more striking.
The generous social security scheme, which compensated losses due to
disability, was created in 1967, at the peak of the post-war economic and
demographic boom. Not surprisingly, it turned out that the level of
compensation was not sustainable over the years, as economic and
demographic growth slowed and moral hazard increased. In a world
involving much economic uncertainty, a program that offered generous
benefits, often approaching full income replacement, attracted a large
number of applicants and, consequently, recipients. As early as the 1970s,
109. Id. at 719.
110. Richard Lewis, The Abolition of Injury Benefit, 34 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 44, 44-45 (1983);
WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 716.
111. WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 716.
112. Jones, supra note 105, at 481-83.
113. Industrial
Injuries
Disablement
Benefit
(Accidents),
DIRECT.GOV.UK,
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOtherSupport/Disabledpeo
ple/DG_10018839 (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
114. WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 716.
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the Dutch system was widely perceived to be “out of control”115 and
“unmanageable.”116 If the government had allowed this system to continue,
17% of the population would have received benefits on account of
“disability” by 2040.117
The major cause that, had it been left uncontrolled, would have ruined
the system was ex post, not ex ante, moral hazard.118 In the Netherlands, it
seems that the disabilities act, as originally designed in 1967, was abused
by employees, often in collusion with their employers, in order to smooth
the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy and the
transition of Dutch families from the traditional single-earner to the dual
career model.119 These may be honorable goals, but they have nothing to
do with disability and cannot be supported on the basis of a system that
allows for nearly-complete income replacement.
In order to keep the scheme alive, the Dutch lawmakers had to
intervene time and again, beginning in the 1980s.120 Step by step, the level
of assistance available under the disability-to-work scheme was lowered,
the requirements regulating access to the system were tightened, and a
schedule for repeated re-examinations during the currency of benefits was
imposed. Together, these measures helped remove the Netherlands from
the top position of the OECD’s list of countries with the highest ratio of
disabled people within the general population.121
Today, the same distortions that haunted the Dutch system of
disability insurance affect its American counterpart, which has run into
serious financial trouble in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The
federal social security disability insurance program provides rather modest
benefits to those unable to work. Due to a rather drastic relaxation of the
insurance trigger towards a largely subjective multi-factor test in 1984 and
the relative increase in the value of disability insurance benefits relative to
wages over time, the program was thought to be unsustainable even before
115. Richard V. Burkhauser, Mary C. Caly & Philip R. de Jong, Curing the Dutch Disease:
Lessons for United States Disability Policy 29 (Univ. of Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Research Paper No.
2008-188, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1337652; see also Jan-Maarten van
Sonsbeek & Raymond Gradus, Estimating the Effects of Recent Disability Reforms in the Netherlands 4
(Tinbergen Inst. Discussion Papers, Working Paper No. 11-121/3, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1655706.
116. Van Sonsbeek & Gradus, supra note 115, at 3.
117. Id. at 2 (internal citation omitted).
118. See supra, Part IV.C.2.
119. Van Sonsbeek & Gradus, supra note 115, at 4–5 (internal citations omitted).
120. For a description of Dutch legislative intervention, see id. at 4–6; Engelhard, supra note 101,
at 57.
121. Van Sonsbeek & Gradus, supra note 115, at 4 (citing OECD, TRANSFORMING DISABILITY
INTO ABILITY: POLICIES TO PROMOTE WORK AND INCOME SECURITY FOR DISABLED PEOPLE (2003)).
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the economic crisis following the financial meltdown of 2008 hit.122
Subsequent to the economic downturn, the payouts of the program have
soared, pushing it towards the brink of bankruptcy.123 Over the last ten
years, the number of recipients has risen by around 64.07 percent with high
concentrations in those areas where the depression has hit hardest and
where unemployment rates are highest.
The upshot of the experience described is that general systems of
disability insurance are extremely vulnerable to ex post moral hazard,
particularly, but by no means exclusively, in times of economic crisis. For
this reason, the idea upon which the Dutch lawmakers of 1967 acted, i.e., to
combine rather generous benefits familiar from workers’ compensation
systems with broad coverage against any disability, regardless of its cause,
proved to be unworkable. Social insurance systems are always vulnerable
to ex post moral hazard and cannot function without the incentives
generated by a significant gap between the level of wages and the level of
benefits. If people are no worse off within the social insurance system
when compared to active participation in the work force, the system is
abused for purposes of early retirement and concealing unemployment.
C. Tort as an Indispensible Fall-Back Mechanism
With regard to the consequences of workplace accidents and
occupational diseases, the demise of social insurance programs has led to
increased reliance on tort. Originally, private claims for compensation were
thought to function as an add-on, particularly in addressing nonpecuniary
losses. In reality, tort has developed into a full-scale remedy invoked to
meet rather basic financial needs. Not surprisingly, the doctrines limiting
access to recovery in tort, i.e., the fault principles and its corollaries, were
placed under pressure. In this way, disability insurance and employers’
liability work together like pistons: the less water the former holds, the
higher the water-mark is in the latter.
Again, Dutch law provides the best illustration: in conjunction with
the scaling down of disability insurance benefits, lawmakers and courts
increased the bite of employers’ liability. Under Articles 7:658(1) and
6:170 of the Dutch Civil Code (Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek – NBW), the
employer is liable not only for the consequences of his own negligence, but
122. David Autor & Mark Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal
Crisis Unfolding 9-15, 20 (MIT Dept. of Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-23,
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=921123.
123. Disability Payments: The Elephant in the Waiting-Room, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2011), at
36–37; Damian Paletta, Insolvency Looms as States Drain U.S. Disability Fund, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22,
2011) at A1, A16.
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also for negligence of the other employees. Thus, the conduct of coworkers is attributed to the employer even if the injury did not affect a third
party but another employee of the same employer.124 In doing so, Dutch
law avoids the consequences of the former common law “fellow-servant
rule” or the “common-employment” principle, pursuant to which the
employer was not liable for the fault of other employees.125 In addition, the
defense of assumption of risk has been eliminated altogether, and the
employer may defend himself with regard to contributory fault only where
he can establish intention or recklessness on the part of the employee
(Article 7:658(2) NBW).126 As if this were not enough, the Supreme Court
of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) applies the fault principle strictly; in other
words, the standard of care imposed on the employer is high.127 At the other
end of the employment relationship, the behavior of the employee is
measured against a rather lenient standard so that claims for compensation
are rarely reduced on account of comparative negligence of the plaintiff.128
Rather, the employee must have acted with intent or “deliberate
recklessness,” i.e., she must have been aware of the recklessness of her
behavior when committing the act. The Hoge Raad even went so far as to
invent a duty to take out market insurance for the benefit of employees.
Under this line of jurisprudence, the employer must supply his employees
with first-party insurance coverage for personal injuries suffered in traffic
accidents.129 Failure to comply with this duty exposes the employer to
liability for the consequences of injuries he could not have prevented at
reasonable cost but could have insured the worker against. This effectively
amounts to a duty of care equivalent to a strict liability regime. The court
created an outcome close to what would have been achieved under
workers’ compensation, albeit through the backdoor.
In the United Kingdom, the action against the employers had always
been kept alive, as the old workmens’ compensation acts did not grant the
employer any immunity under the common law. On the other hand, since
the workers’ compensation system picked up most of the costs of
workplace accidents and occupational diseases, the principles of
employers’ liability remained in their restrictive state as defined by the
trinity of defenses.130 In particular, the defense of “common employment”

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

LINDENBERGH, supra note 30, ¶ 28.
See supra Part III.C., at note 35.
LINDENBERGH, supra note 30, ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 21–23.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 41.
See supra Part III.C, at note 35.
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remained available to the employer and allowed him to reject vicarious
liability for the acts of a fellow worker who had caused the accident
negligently or even intentionally.131 The defense was only formally
abolished in 1948, with the reform of the social security system inspired by
the Beveridge Report.132 Even prior to that date it was already dead, as the
courts had managed to navigate around the rule through the development of
a nondelegable duty of care to organize, equip, and staff the workplace
with a reasonable degree of safety.133 Today, vicarious liability of the
employer for tortious acts of fellow servants, liability for breach of
statutory duty, and the general duty of care to provide “a competent staff of
men, adequate material, and a proper system and effective supervision”134
work together to facilitate the recovery of victims against their employers.
The employer cannot defend himself by pleading “assumption of risk”
based on the fact that the employee failed to quit a dangerous job.135
Nowadays, the defense of contributory negligence does not suffice to
defeat the victim’s claim entirely, but only leads to a reduction in quantum.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, courts seem to allow workers to
recover most of their damages.136
D. Asbestos-Related Diseases as a Touchstone of Liability Systems
The systems of employers’ liability based on tort law that were in
place in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom faced their first serious
challenge when confronted with the problem of asbestos-related diseases
such as asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer. The first cases
involving diseases caused by asbestos entered the English court system in
the late 1990s. Given the modest level of benefits available under the
industrial injuries scheme,137 employees suffering from such serious
diseases had no choice but to resort to tort claims and to try to enforce them
131. E.g., Priestley v. Fowler, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032-33; 3 M. & W. 1, 5–7.
132. Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.41 (Eng.).
133. Wilsons & Clyde Coal Ltd. v. English, [1938] A.C. 57 (H.L.) 78–81; W. V. HORTON
RODGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT, ¶¶ 8-2 to 8-3, 8-10 to 8-14 (17th ed. 2006) (describing the
recorded history of employer’s liability and the nature of the employer’s duty).
134. Wilsons & Clyde Coal Ltd., A.C. 57 at 78 (internal quotations omitted).
135. Harris v. Brights Asphalt Contractors, [1953] 1 Q.B. 617, 628–629; RODGERS, supra note
133, ¶ 8-16 (“The general defence of voluntary assumption of risk is rarely available in cases of
employers’ liability because the courts are unwilling to infer an agreement by the worker to trun the risk
of his employer’s negligence merely because he remains in unsafe employment.”) (internal citations
omitted).
136. RODGERS, supra note 133, ¶ 6-52 (“It has often been stated that safety legislation exists to
protect workers from consequences of their own carelessness, and the courts will therefore be slow to
hold a worker guilty of contributory negligence.”) (internal citations omitted).
137. See supra, Part V.B., note 110.
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in the civil courts. In doing so, the main obstacle to recovery turned out not
to be proving that the employer breached its duty, but rather proving
causation, given that most workers had been exposed to asbestos while
working for several different employers over the course of their lifetime. In
the typical case, only one of the various employers had survived and was in
command of assets, including insurance funds, sufficient to cover claims
for damages. The (former) House of Lords initially committed to holding
each employer liable for the full loss under the theory of joint and several
liability,138 but it later retreated and embraced the principle of proportional
liability, holding each employer liable only for a fraction of the total harm
that reflects his share of the risk relative to the total amount of risk.139
Subsequently, the English parliament intervened and restored, through
legislation, the original rule of joint and several liability.140 The latest
decision of the UK Supreme Court allowed the claim for compensation
even in a case where the exposure of the victim at the workplace increased
the background risk of contracting the disease of mesothelioma by no more
than 18 percent.141 Some suggest that this far-reaching decision was
influenced by the fact that workers suffering from mesothelioma were
otherwise left to rely on the rather basic benefits available under social
security programs.
In the European countries that run workers’ compensation systems,
disease caused by asbestos dust has never been an issue in the civil courts.
Rather, these cases have been taken care of by workers’ compensation
carriers. By aggregating cases, such systems present several advantages
over tort litigation in addressing the problems of multi-factor scenarios.
First, workers’ compensation systems avoid problems related to
establishing employer causation. Second, relatedly, they avoid problems
with allocating tort responsibility among insurers. Third, unlike liability
insurance against tort actions, workers’ compensation systems compensate
victims at current rates.
Under a system of workers’ compensation, it is not necessary for a
worker who suffers from mesothelioma to identify the employer on whose
premises he inhaled the toxic fiber. Where, as in Germany, workers’
compensation carriers are responsible for whole industries, changes of

138. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 A.C. 32 (H.L.).
139. Barker v. Corus UK Plc., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572 (H.L.).
140. Compensation Act 2006, c. 29 §3 (U.K.); Alison McAdams, Barker and the King of Persia,
156 NEW L. J. 1433 (2006); Rebecca Herbert, The Compensation Act 2006, 4 J. PERS. INJ. L. 337, 341–
42 (2006).
141. Sienkiewicz v. Greif (U.K.) Ltd. and Knowsley Metro. Borough Council v. Willmore, [2011]
UKSC [118].
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employment over the course of a work life do not matter much as long as
one may be reasonably certain that the disease was contracted at one of the
several workplaces. In addition, workers’ compensation systems avoid the
intricate problems of identifying the relevant insurance contract that is
liable to answer in any given case. Within systems of employers’ liability,
insurance coverage depends on the trigger defined in the insurance contract
at issue, be it “injuries caused,” “injuries occurring,” or “claims made.”
Different triggers specify different applicable contracts—the contract at the
time of exposure, at the time of manifestation of the illness, or at the time
of filing the insurance claim. In essence, the problems are identical to the
ones that haunted environmental liability insurance in the 1980s and
1990s.142 With regard to liability for asbestos-related diseases, these same
issues are currently litigated heavily in England.143 Moreover, courts must
allocate responsibility among insurers when employers and third parties,
such as building contractors, are jointly and severally liable, when the
liability of several employers is at issue, or even when the victim spent his
whole working life with a single employer. In the last case, the employer
may have had multiple contracts with multiple insurers, so courts must
identify the answerable insurance contract to determine the amount of
coverage and to allocate damages payments to particular insurance periods
and insurers. In contrast, under a well-run workers’ compensation system,
there is no need to force the start of the disease into a time-frame—the
system compensates injured workers regardless of when and in whose
employment the injury occurred.
Finally, in many cases, it may turn out that the insurance contract that
must answer is decades old, so that the sums available as cover are utterly
inadequate. In contrast, workers’ compensation systems present no danger
of inadequate coverage, as workers are compensated for the harm at current
levels of damages payments. In France, victims of asbestos-related diseases
are even entitled to additional benefits, which are added to the pensions
awarded under workers’ compensation.144

142. See Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 4th 645, 655 (1995).
143. Bolton Metro. Borough Council v. Municipal Mutual Ins. Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 50
(Eng.); BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14. For the time being, the English courts have
rejected the so-called “triple trigger theory” adopted by American courts, according to which exposure
to asbestos dust, development of an adverse medical condition, and diagnosis of the manifest disease
are all equally sufficient to make insurers answerable on their contracts. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042-1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
144. Loi. 2000-1257 du 23 décembre 2000 de financement de la sécurité social pour 2001 [Law
2000-1257 of Dec. 23, 2000 on the Financing of Social Security for 2001], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 24, 2000, p. 20558, 20568–76,
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
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E. Conclusion
The abandonment of workers’ compensation in the Netherlands and
the UK is anything but a success story. The promise offered by once
generous social security systems turned out to be unsustainable, mainly
because of rampant ex post moral hazard. As a consequence of the shortfall
of social security, the private action against the employer regained much of
its central role. Not surprisingly, the old disadvantages of the tort system
turn up again, i.e. an unfavorable ratio between benefits and administrative
costs as well as serious difficulties in channeling compensation to victims
in cases involving long-tail risks and multiple tortfeasors. It seems that both
jurisdictions would have been better advised to stick to the somewhat oldfashioned and boring system of workers’ compensation instead of relying
on a combination of social security and tort.
V. CIRCUMVENTIONS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
A. Dissipating the Savings in Administrative Costs
The previous part has shown that doing away with workers’
compensation altogether involves serious disadvantages. However, on a
smaller scale, the same problems also surface in jurisdictions that held on
to the traditional model of workers’ compensation. In many countries that
continue to operate such systems there is an increasing tendency to
circumvent workers’ compensation and instead rely on tort for the
compensation of losses caused by industrial injuries. The common root of
the challenges posed by such attempts seems to be the obvious divergence
between the benefits available in workers’ compensation and in tort. As
explained above, workers’ compensation systems avoid the calculation of
damages in each individual case and instead award pensions on the basis of
an abstract assessment of losses in terms of the degree of disablement.
While it is not clear that this move undercompensates victims
systematically, it does undercompensate those workers who sustained the
most serious injuries and are thus completely disabled, losing their earning
capacity altogether. The wedge between workers’ compensation benefits
and tort damages is further increased by the unavailability of pain and
suffering damages as well as punitive damages in workers’ compensation.
The shortfall of workers’ compensation benefits compared to full tort
damages has triggered a number of troubling developments that tend to
undermine the principles of workers’ compensation and, more importantly,
dissipate the advantages the system was set up for in the first place. The
two main inroads into these principles are:
 Victims seeking to upgrade workers’ compensation benefits to

WAGNER.FINAL.V3 (DO NOT DELETE)

46

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

1/9/2013 11:58 AM

[Vol 23:1

full tort damages—i.e., full income replacement plus
compensation for nonpecuniary harm—by suing the employer
for aggravated fault.
 The prosecution of third parties who are not subject to the
immunity rule that protects the employer from private suits.
While the first point is internal (in the sense that it could be resolved
within the framework of workers’ compensation), actions against third
parties raise important and difficult issues that relate to the positioning of
workers’ compensation within the overall architecture of accident law writ
large. Consequently, the challenge posed by third party actions can only be
resolved within the general context of the liability system. However, both
options raise serious concerns as they threaten to dissipate the main
advantage that justifies workers’ compensation in the first place, i.e. the
significant savings in administrative costs in comparison to a combination
of employers’ liability and liability insurance.
B. Suits against Employers
1. Inroads into the Immunity Principle
In all jurisdictions that operate workers’ compensation schemes, the
immunity rule steps aside where the employer intentionally caused the
harm.145 In such cases, the employee may sue her employer in civil court,
either in contract or in tort, to recover full damages. While these principles
are followed everywhere, the scope of the exception varies greatly. A
narrow reading of intention would require the employer to have acted with
an intention to cause bodily harm to the employee, while for a more lenient
view, it would be sufficient if the employer intended to commit the act or
omission that was the cause of the injury. Under the lenient definition, it is
sufficient for a finding of intention that the employer knowingly breached
safety regulations that were imposed on him. The majority of jurisdictions
subscribed to the narrow view and refused to relax the immunity that
shielded employers as long as the harm was caused accidentally, even if the
conduct of the employer amounted to gross, wanton, willful, deliberate,
intentional, reckless, culpable, malicious or other kinds of aggravated
negligence.146
In many jurisdictions courts have gone far beyond the core meaning of
the concept of intentional harm and have included accidental injuries. In
French law, the move away from a narrow exception to the immunity
145. See, e.g., KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 234 (describing Germany’s worker
compensation scheme); see ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85-86, § 6.36, at 174.
146. LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, supra note 80, § 103.03, at 103-7.
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principle was initiated by the legislature. While the French social security
act incorporates the common rule that the employer may be sued in civil
court where he caused the harm intentionally,147 it goes beyond it by
carving out another exception for cases of inexcusable negligence (faute
inexcusable). Where inexcusable negligence has been established, the
victim receives her ordinary pension plus an additional sum as
compensation from the competent workers’ compensation carrier.148
Alternatively, she may sue the employer directly before the same
administrative tribunal that is competent to hear the claim in workers’
compensation. Provided that this tribunal finds that the behavior of the
employer amounted to inexcusable negligence, the workers’ compensation
institution may recoup any payments made to the victim from the employer
so that the latter bears the full loss.149
In addition, France made the interesting choice to award victims of
asbestos-related illness the privilege of full tort damages independent of a
showing of intention or inexcusable negligence by entrusting the
compensation of these victims to a special branch of the social security
system.150 The so-called FIVA (Fonds d’Indemnisation des Victims de
l’Amiante) serves the double function of, on one hand, supplementing the
workers’ compensation system by providing additional benefits in the form
of higher pensions and a lump-sum payment for nonpecuniary harm, and,
on the other hand, providing compensation to “secondary victims” like the
spouses of workers who were exposed to asbestos dust through their
interaction with the primary victim. As a practical matter, the availability of
additional funds for compensating victims of asbestos helped to deter
litigation in the civil courts where victims had begun to claim for full
damages based on the theory that employers were guilty of gross
negligence (faute inexcusable) and thus could not avail themselves of
workers’ compensation’s immunity rule.
In the United States, the broadening of the concept of intention as it
was traditionally understood within the context of employers’ liability151
was orchestrated not by lawmakers but by the courts which developed the
so-called “substantially certain” test that equates foresight with intention.
Where the plaintiff succeeded in establishing facts that suggested that the
employer had been “substantially certain” to cause harm, the immunity rule

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 384.
LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 385-86.
FRANCE, Code de la sécurité sociale, Art. L 452-2, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
See Loi. 2000-1257 du 23 décembre 2000.
See supra, note 142 and accompanying text.
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stepped aside.152 In many American jurisdictions, the concept is not limited
to cases where the employer intended to do harm but rather extends to
situations where the employer willfully or recklessly failed to comply with
safety rules or instructions or removed safety devices that would have
protected the worker from injury.153 While the former cases are rare, the
latter may be plentiful, given the elasticity of such concepts as recklessness.
As a consequence of the relaxation or supplementation of the
intentional-harm exception, litigation for additional benefits has increased
considerably. In France, it seems that an allegation of inexcusable fault is
now almost routinely added to a claim for workers’ compensation
benefits.154 The French courts have facilitated this development by
interpreting the concept of fault inexcusable in an objective, strict-liabilitylike way: under the theory of a strict duty to provide a safe work
environment (obligation de sécurité de résultat), the employer is liable if it
can be established that rules of safety had not been followed.
With regard to American law, it was proposed to go even further and
allow the injured worker to sue the employer in tort whenever the
hypothetical tort claim exceeded the benefits received under workers’
compensation by at least $10,000.155 While the implementation of this
solution would increase the amount of litigation quite dramatically, it
would simplify the resolution of these disputes, as there would be no need
to plead and prove elusive concepts like “inexcusable negligence.”
2. The Substantive Issues: Full Income Replacement and Damages for
Nonpecuniary Losses?
a) The Seriousness of the Harm
The drive towards private causes of action is fueled by the shortfall of
workers’ compensation benefits as compared to the amount of damages
available in tort. An alignment of workers’ compensation benefits and tort
damages would remove the incentive to turn to the civil courts and to
enforce claims against an employer guilty of intention or aggravated

152. The development of the case law is described by William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm,
Promoting Workplace Safety and Health in the Post-Regulating Era: A Primer on Non-Osha Legal
Incentives that Influence Employer Decisions to Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY L. REV. 9
(1989), at 32-37; LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, supra note 80, § 103.04 (“erosion of the
requirement of actual intent”).
153. LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, supra note 80, § 103.04, at 103-23, 103-36-103-39.
154. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Feb. 28, 2002, D.
[Recueil Dalloz] 2002, 2696 (Fr.); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 386-86.
155. Theodore F. Haas, On Reintegrating Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability, 21
GA. L. REV. 843, 894 (1987).
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negligence. The question of whether workers’ compensation benefits
should be upgraded to approximate or equal tort damages raises two
separate points, namely income replacement and damages for nonpecuniary
losses. As it happens, the two are closely linked to each other.
Workers’ compensation systems do not award damages for
nonpecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering, disfigurement, and loss of
amenities. This is not to say that the damages available under workers’
compensation systems never include such a component. In cases of
comparatively minor bodily injuries that still impede or destroy some
bodily functions, the victim will be awarded a pension for the resulting loss
of her ability to work. While the degree of disability will be small and the
pension modest, over time it will accumulate to a sizable damages award.
However, in many cases of minor injuries, the victim’s income is not
diminished, presumably because many victims adapt quickly to the
disability and manage to make up for it in daily life. Even when no
pecuniary loss is suffered, the pension will be awarded and continue to run
during the work life of the victim. In such cases, the victim is being
overcompensated for her pecuniary losses; thus, the pension assumes the
function of compensating nonpecuniary losses. It allows the injured party
to engage in some costly activities that otherwise would not have been
affordable.
The matter is different for serious injuries and diseases that leave the
victim fully disabled. For this class of victims, which remains excluded
from the workforce, the pension will often fall short of the actual loss in the
form of lost earnings, particularly where these pre-injury earnings had been
above average.156 To the extent that the full pension is needed and used for
the purpose of income replacement, as it often must in cases involving
serious injuries or diseases, it does not contribute anything towards the
compensation of nonpecuniary harm. With regard to serious injuries, the
black-letter proposition that workers’ compensation does not offer benefits
for pain and suffering is still valid.
Arguably, it amounts to a failure of workers’ compensation systems
that over-compensates the lightly injured and under-compensates those
who have been seriously disabled. In Germany, the exclusion of damages
for nonpecuniary losses from the benefits offered by workers’
compensation schemes has been challenged on constitutional grounds
twice.157 The petitioners pointed to the inconsistency of a legal regime that
156. See supra, Part II.D.
157. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 7, 1972,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 34, 118, 129-135; BVerfG, Feb.
8, 1995, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 1995, 1607 f.; KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8,
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leaves victims empty-handed by denying compensation for nonpecuniary
losses while simultaneously extending the immunity rule to shield the
employer from liability for such losses. The Federal Constitutional Court
disagreed. In the eyes of the justices, workers’ compensation systems are
based on an implicit bargain in which the worker eschews full
compensation of any loss sustained in exchange for no-fault liability of a
public insurance carrier which both provides rather generous support in
cases of minor injuries, only adequate compensation in cases of major
injuries, and eliminates the risk of insolvency.
b) Including Damages for Non-Pecuniary Losses
While this is all true, the question remains whether it is sound policy
to exclude nonpecuniary losses from the scope of compensation altogether
and whether it makes sense to overcompensate those who sustained only
minor injuries. As a matter of policy—rather than constitutionality—these
choices seem hard to defend. First of all, empirical studies suggest that
workers would be prepared to pay the price, in the form of reduced wages,
for more comprehensive coverage.158 This finding contradicts the
assumption, made in the general economic theory of compensation
systems, i.e., that it is not in the interest of workers to insure against
nonpecuniary losses, provided that they have to pay for it, as they must
here in the form of wage reductions.159 The major shortfall of the current
system seems to be that there is no inverse relation between the gravity of
the injury and the demand for pain and suffering damages. Quite the
opposite: victims who have the strongest interest in damages for pain and
suffering are those who have sustained the most serious injuries. But it is
precisely this class of victims who suffer most from the current system. It
seems absurd that the current system denies compensation of this part of
the total losses to those who need it most and awards it to others who need
it less. If any discrimination between victims were appropriate, then the
rule would have to be the other way around, i.e., to award damages for
nonpecuniary loss to the severely injured and deny it to those who have
suffered only minor injuries.
c) Restraining Moral Hazard
An important consideration counseling against an increase in workers’

at 236-37.
158. MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 51 (“Taken at face value, these results imply that
existing levels of workers’ compensation benefits are suboptimal from the standpoint of insuring
income levels.”).
159. SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 228-30.
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compensation benefits is moral hazard.160 It has been explained above that
the unusual combination of strict liability and the absence of a contributory
negligence defense, which is the hallmark of a workers’ compensation
system, is sustainable partly because benefits fall short of full
compensation.161 Because workers are not made indifferent between the
state of injury plus a compensation package, and the state without the
injury and without the compensation package, their incentives to take care
and avoid injuries remain largely intact. The expansion of benefits to
approximate full compensation seems to remove the essential safeguard
against moral hazard, i.e., the undercompensation of victim-employees.
Indeed, empirical studies have shown that increases in benefit levels
generate moral hazard in the form of an increased number of claims and a
longer duration of disablement.162
However, this conclusion does not necessarily counsel against
increasing benefits for serious injuries because moral hazard would remain
manageable. With regard to ex ante moral hazard, workers will still prefer
the state of the world without the serious injury—e.g., loss of leg, loss of
eyesight—to a state with the injury even if the compensation package were
increased significantly.163 This is most pronounced in the case of fatal
injuries: increasing the benefits available to the family of dead workers
does not lead to a decrease in precautions against death.164 In addition and
even more importantly, the risk of ex post moral hazard—i.e., the
fabrication of injuries—seems to be manageable, too. Since serious injuries
are much more difficult to imitate, the risk of abuse and fraud is only
minor. Again, fatal accidents provide the best example.
d) Economizing Administrative Costs
Second, the exclusion of damages for pain and suffering generates
strategies to circumvent the immunity rule and to sue the employer for
aggravated fault or to go against third parties. Within the current system,
workers who suffer injuries receive less compensation than the victims of
other accidents, such as traffic victims. As a consequence, workers injured
on the job will try to circumvent the workers’ compensation system and to
top-up their damages by suing either the employer, alleging intentional
wrongdoing or inexcusable negligence (depending on the scope of the
exception from the immunity rule), or third parties who may be liable in
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See Epstein, supra note 35, at 801, 809.
See supra, Part IV.A.3.
MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 53-68.
See supra, Part. IV.A.3.
MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 29.

WAGNER.FINAL.V3 (DO NOT DELETE)

52

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

1/9/2013 11:58 AM

[Vol 23:1

tort.165 To the extent that this happens, another layer of administrative costs
is added to the bill that employers have to pay.
e) Conclusion
In light of these considerations lawmakers would be well advised to
redistribute the payouts under workers’ compensation away from the
lightly injured in favor of the seriously injured. As to the latter, pensions
should be increased up to the point of full equivalence of after-tax income,
and damages for pain and suffering should be added to the bill. As it is
close to impossible to imitate serious injuries or diseases, the risk of abuse
posed by such a move should be negligible and the consequences of such a
reform therefore predictable and manageable.
3. The Administrative Issue: Upgrading Workers’ Compensation
Benefits vs. Private Suits against Employers
The next question concerns the choice of a procedural mechanism
suitable to claims for full compensation. One way to improve the current
situation would be to abandon the immunity principle altogether and to
allow ordinary tort suits against the employer in all cases. Such a move
would obviously raise the fundamental question of the justification for the
continued existence of workers’ compensation systems. Why run special
compensations schemes if the victims may resort to the general law
anyway? To the extent that victims used workers’ compensation as an
institution of first resort and the tort action as an opportunity for additional
damages, such duplicative mechanisms would be very costly to operate.
The reinstatement of the private action against the employer would have to
coincide with the scrapping of workers’ compensation institutions. The
experience of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands suggests that such a
move would not be wise.
An alternative to the present state of affairs, where exceptions to the
immunity rule increase in number and scope, is offered by the French
solution of integrating claims for full compensation based on inexcusable
fault into the system of workers’ compensation. In cases of inexcusable
fault, the victim may either sue the employer or collect additional damages
from the competent workers’ compensation carrier.166 In the latter case, the
courts of general jurisdiction are not involved at all. One important
advantage of this solution is that claims are settled in one step and within a
single type of proceeding, either (exclusively) a lawsuit or (exclusively) a
workers’ compensation claim. This solution avoids the duplicative
165. See infra, Part VI.C.
166. LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 384-86.
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litigation of identical issues before both civil courts and workers’
compensation boards, thus sparing scarce judicial and administrative
resources.
The proposal to provide for additional compensation for serious
injuries and diseases within the scheme of workers’ compensation mirrors
the French approach to inexcusable fault that allows for the
supplementation of the compensation awarded to the victim within the
institutions and processes of the workers’ compensation system. However,
unlike in France, the upgrade available for serious injuries and diseases
must be made mandatory, excluding the option to sue the employer for
damages in civil court. In addition, the upgrade available in workers’
compensation should not be limited to cases involving aggravated fault.167
In limiting the additional compensation to cases of aggravated fault, French
law introduces a requirement that is foreign to the other areas of the
workers’ compensation system and whose elements are difficult to prove.
Therefore, it is not surprising that litigation around the concept of faute
inexcusable is intense and administrative costs are significant. In addition,
the requirement of aggravated fault does not remedy the inconsistency
inherent in current systems of workers’ compensation, i.e., to
overcompensate minor injuries and to undercompensate the severely
injured. There is no correlation between the degree of fault and the severity
of the injury or disease. If the current situation is to be improved, additional
benefits must be channeled into the pockets of those victims who suffered
the most serious harms and not be distributed evenly across the class of
victims who were affected by an employer’s grossly negligent behavior.
Changes in the law that would allow the seriously injured to recover
damages for nonpecuniary harm, and a pension achieving full income
replacement, would adequately correspond to the shortcomings of current
workers’ compensation systems while at the same time avoiding the
additional litigation and associated costs the current system generates.
Within a system that allows the seriously injured to recover additional
benefits, there is no incentive for separate actions launched against the
employer individually, and even less so for separate civil actions that
would be particularly costly. Rather, it would suffice if the victim applied
for additional benefits and the workers’ compensation carrier or the
competent dispute resolution board found that the injury was serious
enough to warrant additional compensation.

167. See supra Part VI.B.1.
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C. Claims against third parties
1. U.S. Exceptionalism
Another strategy aimed at making victims whole within the current,
undercompesatory system targets not the employer, but third parties. Even
though the immunity granted by workers’ compensation schemes in all
jurisdictions is limited to employers, suits against third parties are
pervasive only in the United States. In the United States, manufacturers of
machinery, plant equipment, and raw materials have been sued on a large
scale by employee-plaintiffs seeking to recover full damages for workplace
accidents and diseases.168 In fact, the pursuit of claims against third parties
in cases involving occupational hazards has become routine in the United
States, even though these claims should be the primary responsibility of
workers’ compensation carriers.
The most prominent examples are the various illnesses caused by the
inhalation of asbestos dust at the workplace. The descent of the major
American producers of asbestos products into bankruptcy from an
avalanche of tort claims is well-documented, and the evolution of
American tort law that helped to bring about this outcome has been
discussed repeatedly.169 From a comparative perspective, one striking
feature of this story is the total absence of workers’ compensation from the
picture.170 It was easy to foresee that asbestos-related diseases would create
problems in jurisdictions that had abandoned workers’ compensation, like
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but in the United States, one
would have expected that asbestos would be dealt with primarily, if not
exclusively, under workers’ compensation schemes. But, in fact, rather than
bankrupting workers’ compensation carriers, the flood of claims for
damages associated with asbestos bankrupted the manufacturers of
asbestos-made products. The obvious question is how could this happen?
2. Explanations
The explanation for the large-scale responsibility of third-parties for
168. See Paul C. Weiler, Workers’ compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of a Tort
and a Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825 (1989); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and
Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 485-88 (1984); William A.
Dreier, Injuries to Production Workers: Reform of the Workers’ Compensation Product Liability
Interface, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 813 (1995-1996).
169. The leading bankruptcy case is In re Johns-Manville Corp. 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.),
decision aff’d in part, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), order aff’d, Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843
F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). For a comprehensive study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice cf.
STEPHEN C. CARROLL, DEBORAH HENSLER, JENNIFER GROSS, ELIZABETH M. SLOSS, MATTHIAS
SCHONLAU, ALLAN ABRAHAMSE & J. SCOTT ASHWOOD, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 107-123 (2005).
170. For an early critique of this situation see Epstein, supra note 162, at 486.
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the harm caused by asbestos products covers two areas, namely the
interface between workers’ compensation and tort on the one hand, and
products liability on the other. To begin with the first area, the relationship
between workers’ compensation and the general law of torts is organized
by two principles:171
 No immunity for third parties. While the employer is
protected from private suits for damages based on workplace
accidents and occupational diseases, third parties are not so
protected. They remain fully exposed to employees’ damages
claims.
 Right of recourse against third parties for employers and
workers’ compensation carriers. To the extent that third
parties are being held liable for the consequences of workrelated risks, their responsibility takes priority over the
responsibility of the employer, or the workers’ compensation
carrier that insulates the employer from liability. One
consequence of the priority of third-party liability is that a
court awarding damages to the victim in a successful tort
action against a third party has to set off prior benefits
received from workers’ compensation institutions. In the face
of this prospect, the incentive of the victim to seek benefits
from workers’ compensation carriers is rather weak in the
presence of a strong third-party claim, as there is nothing to
gain but an advance on the recovery available in tort.172
Secondly, and depending on the way in which workers’
compensation systems are set up, either the employer or the
workers’ compensation carrier succeeds to the damages claim
of the victim against the third party by way of subrogation or
assignment. With regard to claims with a relatively low
probability of success, damages suits against third parties for
personal injuries are often not even initiated by victims and
their lawyers, but by employers and their insurers who bring
or finance tort actions for their own benefit.173 An empirical
study has found that no less than one quarter of product
liability actions involving occupational hazards were brought
not by victims, but by employers or workers’ compensation
carriers, enforcing their subrogation rights.174
171. LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 42-43.
172. See Epstein, supra note 168, at 486.
173. See Weiler, supra note 168, at 836.
174. W. Kip Viscusi, The Interaction between Product Liability and Workers’ Compensation as Ex
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The combination of these doctrines caused a considerable portion of
the costs of workplace injuries and diseases to be shifted away from
employers and workers’ compensation carriers and onto manufacturers of
equipment and raw materials. As early as the mid-1970s, the total payouts
to employees under tort for permanent disablement were more than twice
the amount of the benefits received under workers’ compensation.175 This
result is surprising in light of the fact that the two principles—no immunity
against tort claims protecting third parties, and rights of recourse of
employers or workers’ compensation carriers against third parties who are
liable in tort for the same harm—are not exclusive to American law but a
common feature of workers’ compensation systems.176 Thus, the
prevalence of third-party suits in the U.S. remains a puzzle.
The key to understanding the developments in the U.S. is not in the
interface between workers’ compensation and tort; rather, it lies in the
distinctive features of American tort law, or rather, of its special branch of
products liability. The concept of product defect was applied to tools,
machinery, equipment, and raw materials as if equipment and materials had
been distributed to employees, without accounting for the involvement of
employers. Under current doctrines of products liability law, equipment
manufacturers must make sure that their products are safe even if the harm
was caused by the negligent or even reckless behavior of the employer.177
In the leading case for this doctrine, the operator of a high-lift loader was
injured after he had jumped off the vehicle in apprehension of its tipping
over. The manufacturer of the loader was held liable even though the
victim had never received adequate training to operate the device and had
been assigned to the task by his employer on the day of the accident only
because the regular operator had not reported for work.178 What is most
remarkable about this decision is not its result but that the court did not
even care to discuss the involvement of the employer. Instead, it analyzed
the case as if the loader had been distributed directly to consumers—a
proposition clearly in conflict with the facts.179 Manufacturers of
equipment and raw materials are held liable for the consequences of
workplace accidents and diseases not only if the employer entrusted the
Post Remedies for Workplace Injuries, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 185, 192 (1989).
175. Weiler, supra note 168, at 829.
176. As to Germany KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 306-307; as to France LAMBERT-FAIVRE
& PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 388.
177. The leading case is, Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); within the
context of asbestos the leading case is, Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549,
552-553 (Cal. 1991); cf. also Weiler, supra note 168, at 836-837.
178. Barker, 573 P.2d at 447.
179. See id. at 454.
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equipment to unskilled, untrained, or otherwise unable employees, but also
if he failed to take simple precautions, ignored safety instructions, or
removed safety devices installed by the manufacturer. A study undertaken
in the 1970s—before the onslaught of mass tort litigation involving
asbestos-related diseases—found that one quarter of all product liability
cases filed by employees against third parties involved some negligence on
the part of their employers.180
3. A Critique of Third-Party Liability for Industrial Injuries
The legal problem that lies at the root of the current situation is not the
immunity of third parties in general. The failure to grant third parties the
same immunity as the employer is common to all workers’ compensation
systems. This is for good reason, since it is essential to preserve the
incentives of third parties to take care.
a) Deterrence
The real issue is not the liability of third parties in general, but the
duties of care imposed on manufacturers of equipment and raw materials in
particular. Obviously, the safety measures taken by equipment
manufacturers interact with the precautions taken by the employer. To a
large degree, the precautions of employers and those of equipment
manufacturers are substitutes of one-another. In such a situation, it is
essential to adjust the standard of care and the attribution of liability in a
way that the total costs of precautions taken to reach the efficient level of
harm are being minimized. This cannot be done if the focus is on one party
only, i.e., the equipment manufacturer, and the outcome will be even worse
where the focus is on the wrong party, i.e., on the party that is not in
control of the decisions proximate to the accident or cause of disease.
Employers are not only buyers of equipment and raw materials but
professional parties with duties of their own to control the use and
operation of such equipment and to manage the associated risks. It is the
employer who controls the workplace and is thus in the best position to
manage occupational risk. The employer decides which safety equipment
to install and how to use it, how to educate and train employees, how long
to expose employees to hazardous conditions, which employees to assign to
a certain task, etc. To the extent that a large portion of the costs of
workplace accidents and occupational diseases is shifted away from
employers and onto equipment manufacturers, the incentives of employers
to take precautions and to invest in workplace safety are seriously
undermined. In effect, the party that is closest to the risk and could most
180. Weiler, supra note 168, at 837.
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effectively control the level of workplace safety—the party who is the
“cheapest cost avoider”—is insulated from liability.181 The adverse effects
of such a rule are particularly pronounced where the employer entrusts
dangerous machinery to employees who are unskilled in its proper use. In
this case, a liability rule targeting the manufacturer generates incentives to
make equipment fool-proof, i.e., so safe that it can even be operated by
unskilled people without causing any harm. The same level of safety could
be achieved at lower cost if the employer contributed his share of
precautions. These arguments also apply to asbestos-related diseases as the
employer decides on the duration and conditions of exposure, e.g., whether
to install ventilation or provide protective clothing.182 To place the full
burden upon manufacturers of asbestos products is not the most efficient
way to achieve a desired level of safety.
The choice of precautions and the distribution of the costs of liability
between employers and their suppliers of equipment and raw materials
should be left to the contractual arrangements of these parties and not be
superimposed by an overbroad system of products liability. Under the
current system, the parties to the sales contract of work equipment lack the
power to allocate the responsibilities for safety measures and the resulting
liabilities between them. This situation cannot be remedied within workers’
compensation law but must be addressed in the law of products liability.
With the exception of cases of flagrant product defects, the responsibility
for the safety of work equipment must be focused on the employer, not the
manufacturer.
b) Administrative Costs
The second concern raised by adding third party liability relates to
administrative costs. While workers’ compensation systems are much
cheaper to run than the tort system, they still consume resources in their
administration.183
These resources are well invested if workers’
compensation institutions manage to settle the dispute. In the United States,
however, this is not the case. Workers’ compensation provides only the
first layer of compensation, if the employee claims anything from these
carriers at all. In many cases, a second suit is brought in tort so that another
layer of dispute, litigation and, in case of success, compensation is added.
Given that the administrative costs of the tort system are already high on

181. SHAVELL, supra note 100, at 189-90 (discussing the notion of least-cost avoider in bilateral
relationships). The present case is different as it presents a trilateral relationship involving the victimemployee, her employer, and the manufacturer of equipment or raw materials.
182. See supra, Part V.D.
183. Weiler, supra note 168, at 839.
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their own, the total sum of administrative costs will be truly exceptional if
the costs of two systems are added together. In granting full tort damages
on top of benefits available in workers’ compensation, American law puts a
double burden of administrative costs on society. To put this point in
perspective, consider the following estimates of costs spent dealing with
asbestos-related diseases. In the U.S., these costs as of 2005 were estimated
to run up to $72 billion, of which $40 billion or roughly 57 percent were
spent on litigation costs. These costs are likely to increase in the future, as
illustrated by the (failed) proposal of the Fairness in Asbestos Injury
Resolution Act of 2005, which contemplated setting up a trust fund in the
amount of an additional $140 billion.184 In contrast, the German workers’
compensation carriers are expected to spend roughly $10 billion on benefits
and health care for asbestos related diseases.185 Given that the
administrative costs of this system are 10 percent and that the population of
Germany is a little more than one quarter of the U.S.’ , these numbers
translate into a hypothetical bill of $44 billion. This includes administrative
costs of $4 billion, as compared to U.S. litigation costs of $40 billion.
VI. CONCLUSION
General social security schemes awarding substantial benefits for
disability regardless of cause do not work since they are vulnerable to ex
post moral hazard, i.e., abuse and fraud. The taxpayer, the government, and
the agencies of the social security administration are unable to successfully
control abuse. The experience of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
both of which abandoned workers’ compensation for a combination of
general social security benefits and employers’ liability, is not encouraging
enough to recommend such a move. Therefore, the replacement across the
board of liability in tort by general no-fault compensation schemes is not
desirable. This is true even if the adverse effects of such schemes on
incentives to take care and adjust activity levels are ignored. If the adverse
effects of ex ante moral hazard in the form of reduced care and ex post
moral hazard in the form of phony claims are added together, the case
against no-fault is even more compelling.
Focused no-fault schemes like workers’ compensation do work if they
are managed well. Overall, it seems that the traditional systems of workers’
compensation have done much better in coping with the retreat of the
welfare state and with the onslaught of long-tail risks in the form of

184. Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The Fairness in Asbestos
Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2005-2006).
185. Joachim Breuer, Asbest – eine globale Herausforderung, 2005 BUNDESARBEITSBLATT 20.
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illnesses involving long latency periods, such as asbestosis and
mesothelioma. The crucial element that defined the relative success of
workers’ compensation is that there is a party, or a group of parties, who
have to come up for the bill and therefore have an incentive to control
costs, an incentive the taxpaying public does not have or cannot articulate
effectively. These parties must be put in charge of the claims resolution
process, not in the sense that they are able to control outcomes but in the
sense that they determine how the trade-off between administrative costs
and accuracy in sifting out invalid claims is being made.
Once a focused no-fault scheme has been established, courts and
legislators must ensure that the system is not doubled up by the liability
system. Otherwise, the promise of workers’ compensation, namely
substantial savings in administrative costs, is wasted. Workers’
compensation systems are currently in danger of being pushed aside by
ever more expansive exceptions from the immunity principle in cases of
aggravated fault. Lawmakers could deflate incentives to circumvent the
immunity principle and to sue employers for full damages in tort by
increasing the benefits available to victims of serious injuries and diseases.
This group of victims does not receive full compensation under the current
regime and thus has a strong incentive to resort to tort remedies rather than
to workers’ compensation in search of full income replacement, as well as
damages for nonpecuniary losses. The additional benefits should be made
available within workers’ compensation rather than adding tort as another
costly compensation system on top of workers’ compensation schemes.
The risk of ex post moral hazard in the form of exaggerating or imitating
injuries, while considerable in the area of minor injuries, seems
manageable with regard to serious injuries and, particularly, cases
involving death.
The development in the United States is particularly troublesome for
the additional reason that workers’ compensation has been overtaken by
third party liability for defective products in many important areas, such as
the harm caused by asbestos-related diseases. Legal systems that run
workers’ compensation schemes and liability systems in tandem and with
regard to the same type of injury save nothing in terms of administrative
costs but rather impose a double burden on society. In addition, the shifting
of the costs of work-related accidents and diseases onto manufacturers of
equipment and raw materials distorts incentives to take care. Employers
rather than equipment manufacturers are the cheapest cost avoiders with
regard to occupational hazards and thus must be made to internalize the
costs associated with workplace accidents and occupational diseases. As a
consequence, products liability law needs to retreat from industrial injuries.
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The responsibility for the safety of the workplace vis-à-vis workers must be
focused on the employer, and the liability of equipment manufacturers
should be left to the contract made between them and employers.

